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How Does Childbirth A1ter Intrahousehold Resource 
Allocation?: Evidence from Japan 
Abstract 
Exploiting llniqlle panel data that inclllde direct rneaSllrernents of resource allocation 
within hOllseholds， we investigate the illlpaιt of childbirth on intrahollsehold allocation 
for lllarried Japanese cOllples. I3ased on a collective lllodel of the hOllsehold and aslll 
ing weak separability， we develop redllced-forlll and structural-forlll凹 tilllationeqllations 
that allow lS to fOCllS on privatc goods to track thc changcs in intrahollschold rc弓ol1rcc
allocation. ¥Vc find onc additional child is assoeiatcd with a rcduction in thc wifc's pri 
vate expenditllre share of at least two percentage points. This is probably becallse she 
sllb叫itlltesrnore say in d町 isionson children for her private expenditllre share 
JEL classification codes: Dll. D12. D13. .12. 




Childbirth is one of the rnost important life events for rnany eouples. The newborn bring 
about ncw rcsponsibilitics， onc of whieh is cconomie rcsponsibility. Thc couplc as parcnts 
has to face additional expenses related to the baby-cribs， diapers， baby clothes and toys， 
to name but a f，守w.The couple will also face other costs， such as education and llledical 
expellses， asthe ehild grows up 
Child birth rnay bril巴aboutsome economie benefit出 suehas il引nnetax口editfor 
childrcn， childbirth bcncfit and dcpcndcnt allowancc. HO¥¥中vcr，thc childrcn typieally do 
not pay for themselves. Hence‘increased spending on children must be accommodated 
by reducing expenditures or savings 
Then‘the questioll is， how does the eouple eope官iththe additional expellses for 
the children? Does the mother， father， or both reduce their expellditure on private 
goods goods cnjoycd by a singlc individual'! Or do thcy rcdl1CC thc cxpcnditnrc on 
(intrahousel叫 d)p山 licgoods-goods enjoyed by the couple cωo叫l吐泊le町削ぐct附 l防y'?Tl附 eql附 t川 1
ar ぞkey to the und ぞ町rstandingof w、.vhoshoulde目rsth ぞburde町nof n ぞ引wre凹sponsibilitiぞ凹sfor the 
ne引、w、.vborn.Thi目spaper is one of the五rstattempts to direetly answer these questions 
As we shall see in Seetion 2， economists and sociologists haも'elong investigated how 
rcsol1recs arc alloeatcd within a hOl1schold. Howcvcrヲanalysisof thc impaet of ehildbirth 
on intrahousehold allocations h出 beendifficult due to a lack of data. lvIost consulllption 
data are collected at the household level. However， asshown by Chiappori and Ekeland 
(2006)， w hellever the hOl附holddemand function is eom J川 iblewith the Pareto e伍clenc~y
at the household level (eollective川削
¥V吐甘1此thpurcly privatc eι onsl1mption aIH吋dalso 、W、.vithcol日lれ円ctivcration凶alitv羽withpnrcly pl1bl日lC: 
ぐonsumption. ¥Ve shall overCOllle this problem by using a unique panel dataset that 
includes direct llleasurement of the intrahousehold resource allocation， orthe sharing 
rule‘details of whieh will be diseussed later 
To identify the impact of ehildbirth Ol illtrahou同 holdresouree alloeation， we develop 
r円111ccd-formand strnctl1ral-form spccifi仁ationswithin a l1ni五円1thcorctical fram円.vork
Under both specifications‘we observe that the wife司sshar 
2 
Section ;) disCllSSeS the data and rneaSUl可ernentiSSlleS， Section 6 presents the estirnation 
reslllts， and五nallySection 7 provides discllssion and conclllding rernarks. 
2 Review of Related Literature 
Sociolo日istshave long bee凹nlntere制stedin the alloc白ationof reSOllrc白es、Wvithi凹1日nhOllsehold， 
III虻凶仙cllld
Thcsc and lIlanりyothcr soc口:iologicalstlldics howcvc1' havc focnscd on thc lIlanagcmcnt 
and dccision-making of honschold financc司 anddo not answc1' how chi日ldbirthaltcれ、可1'sthcれ、
凶，1'制川ra凶、1叶hOl
t仙hat、wl什he日附q町叩nt叶h同ehcり叩}川us悦eho叫ldf品白1Il凶ar日町I虻亡e倒sa紅rern剖仙I凶a巴伊e刷吋din凹lde同句p同er山ldent此lya剖Il(川dwornen are expected 
to bear the cost of children‘childbirth reslllts in increased巴enderineqllality in spendin呂
This study， howcvcr， lacks scrions cmpi1'ical invcstigation 
Economists‘on thc othc1' hand， havc traditionally vicwcd houscholds as a singlc nnit 
fo1' decision-making. This“llnita1'Y吋 modelis convenient and has some theoretical jlS 
ti出1川刈a，川肌1叶叩tl山【or凶 (いe.g.Be肘叫ck司町er(1973， 1974町 1981)け).Recent s刈仰tlld心lie制s町 h，何e肝、Vア81'町 }削ア噌esl山hc川:
the lni日taryIIH叫odelis inadeqlla川tein explaini凹1日nghOllsehold beha削、n【o江Iι. In conseqllence， the 
collcc川C川t川 mo削吋d恥州l恥clsp川 1削ccrcdby C句jhia叩ppori(1988， 19ω叫2幻)1凶V刊れ g炉a山 xl1刈川
a剖ss叩umcthat thc int廿1'ahouschold1'cson1'cc allocation is Pa1'cto c伍eicnt司 andcxplieitly dcal 
with the heterogeneity of p町長1'encesamong hOllsehold members. Under weak 也ちsllmp-
tion ぅthey can be irnplernented by a hOll 討附ehold、官elfare fllncti 【onthat is a 、Wq臼1目hted討引lrnof 
th悶e11山l(川凶d目lVl(凶1叫討ぶ p戸r川 teI川tilit勺yアfllnctio凶 (Br目mり川)¥vn凹 i目et al上.， 2006) 
Thc collcctivc modcl of thc honschold has also bccn cxtcndcd to incorporatc pnbli仁
goods by Blnndcll ct al. (2005). Thcy sh開 thatindividnal wclfa1'c and thc dcc目的H
process can be identified官itheithe1' a separability assllmption or the p1'esence of a dis 
triblltion factor. However， general identification reslllts are not possible in a typical 
ernpirical setting， where the randorn error terrn in the labor sllpply eqllations and the 
cqnation for pnblic goods cxpcnditn1'c a1'c not scpa1'ablc 
We also employ a collective model of the hOllsehold with Pllblic goods in this stlldy. 
h 官ithl3l11ndell et al. (2005)， we conside 
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。fchildren il the household， results in a change in the sharillg rule alld how it relates to 
the rnOvernellt along the utility possibility frontier for the couple 
SccondヲBlunddlct al. (2005) assurnc that lcisurc is mcas11l'cd as a proportion 01' thc 
time not spent on earning labor income. ¥Vhile this a，出umptionis standard， itdoes not 
appear appropriate in our study. When a child is born， the burden of child-rearing will 
increase. Therefor札 theactual leisure time rnay substantially decrease after childbirth， 
evell when the observed tirne spent on earnin巴laborinぐりmeremains the sarne. In this 
studvヲwcusc thc dircct mcasurcmcnt 01' domcstic羽Torkand lcisur、c.
Third， I3lundell et al. (2005) also ass刊umetl削 the publ日icgoods ぞぽxpe町1凶 i比tu旧 ぐ凶叩a出nbe 
measured， but not private goods exp目lditurefor削 chof the two lllain household members 
However， as we shall argue later， the distillction bet川マel public and private goods is 
not straightforward， and rnay depend on the household. Hence， ina typical empirical 
application， itis di白川ltto mca可11l'Cthc puhlic goods cxpcnditurc without an arhitrary 
definition of public goods. In this study， we leave the burden of deciding what is public 
and private respectively to the respondents. 
Fourth， our choice enables the de口、ationof a structural-forIl estirnatioll equation 
u甘houtsp町 ifyingthc functional form 01' thc utility function， and whilc kccping thc 
cstimation cquations managcahlc. H叩 cc，our cmpirical rcsults arc not drivcn hy thc 
choice of utilitv functions. 
Finally， asI3lundell et al. (2005) point out， the existen開。fcorner solutions in labor 
supply is di伍cultto deal with. Givell that our intere叫 isil rneasurillg the irnpact of 
childhirth on intrahouschold rcsourcc allocation and not in thc lahor supply dccisions 
thcmsdvcsヲwcchosc not to modd thcm cxplicitly 
¥Ve also aSSUllle away the f，ぞrtilitydecisions， because the consulllption decisions we 
observe in the data are over a month，官hereasthe fertility decisions presumably have a 
rnuch 101l巴ertirne horizoll. Therefore， itappears reasollable to assurne that the rnonthly 
ωnsumption dccisions arc madc taking thc numh目。fchildrcn as givcn. Of C011l'SCヲ
fcrtility d町 isionsand consumption d町 isionsmay hc linkcd hccausc thcy hoth involvc 
bargaining within the couple. We s 
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problernatic Whell we wallt to illdude the llurnber of childrell in the distribution factors， 
l 附 ause we expect this figl 問 to 山 Teaseove官rtun同e(aωS剖制S別叩urr
Scc引~OIl(吋d ， thc Eulcr cstimation (れ、Y刈quationsus附れdin his studiれ伺sdo not ans削、¥V、vcrh凶0羽wthc rcsourcc 
allocation within the couple is affected by the changes in the distribution factor. 
Most of the elllpirical studies on intrahousehold allocation have attempted to test the 
unitary rnodel. To this end， earlier studies h品ア噌etωes刈-刊te刷dthe inc引ωorne-p'川001目III巴h巧ypothe伺Sl目s.Fo汀r 
e位xa旧rn叫II中ple札.Tho肌rna制β (ο19ω9卯州0川)t悦q附州ト討叫山i品tωsthe悶 山 0肌rn凶le-]
a削仙H吋1dI川れ円目crn口ゴ'alin町 Cωomcson thc childr叩 'shcalth 0川 comc.L1町 Ibcrgct al. (1997)， on thc 
other hand， test the incollle-pooling hypothesis by exploiting the institutional change in 
the UK child bene自tschellle. which shifted resources from husbands to wiv凹 Thev自nd
there was a substantial increase il spending on wornell's and children's dothing relative to 
rnell's clothing after the illstitutional challges. These studies alld rnany others reject the 
incomc-pooling hyr川 hcs凹 Howcvcr司副 pointcd0川 byBrowning ct al. (2006)司cmpirical
rejections of the income-pooling hypothesis do not imply rぞjectionsof the unitary model. 
Instead of testi時 theincome-pooli時 hypothesis，I3rowni時 andChiappori (1998) propose 
an ernpirical test of the unitary model based on the Slutsky引mditions.They reject the 
unitary modcl using a Canadian data sct 
Our study diH'crs from thcsc studic弓intwo important aspccts. First司 instcadof tcsting 
the unitary model‘官efocus on how the decision-makinfi po官eris influenc引1by childbirth 
We can do this by exploiting the direct llleaゐurementof intrahousehold resource allocation 
in our data set. Secolld， rnost ernpirical studies we revi引、edabove fail to allow for the 
unobscrvcd hctcrogcncity across houscholds. Thc pancl structurc of our data sctヲhowcvcr司
allows us to control for such unobscrvablc diH'crcnccs among couplcs 
3 Analytical Framework 
The purpose of this section is to lay out the allalytical frarnework for our empirical 
analysis. ¥Vc show thc conditions undcr which thc changcs in thc houschold Parcto 
weight can be traced by the pattern of the pri、ategoods consulllption. ¥Ve then develop 
estimation equations， inboth reduced and structural forms， inthe next section. 
Weili哨urnethat the ulit of decision-rnaking is a (りuplιwhereaωuple consists of 
a husband h and a wife w. ¥Ve only cOllsider married引mples‘becausewe lack data 
on intrahouschold rcsourcc allocation for unmarricd couplcs. A hou8ehold is a lnit that 
indudes a couple， and possibly SOllle children and other household members. ¥Ve assume 
children and oth目 householdmembers a旺8ctthe intrahousehold resource allocation onlv 
through the cou ple‘s decision cOllcerning the provision of public goods 
Consider n goods in the economy. For eadl household， eadl of these n goods is 
classi自cdcithcr as a privatc good or a public good. Privatc goods arc cnjoycd by only onc 
melllber of the couple， whereas the public goods are enjoyed by both. Public goods in our 
。
rnodel may include those goods enjoyed by the children and other household mernbers， 
because the couple cares about their welfare 
l¥otc hcrc that thcrc is no obviolls distinction bctwccn priもatcand pllb!ic goods in 
gene1'al. Take food as an exalllple. Food is dearly exdudable and di、isible，and， hence， 
appea1's a p1'ivate good. Howe、マム onecould a1'gue that food consulllption is a public 
good because the couple call e1りoythe food more by consurning it jointly二 Thus，the 
classificatioll of public and J則、ategoods is dependellt UpOll the hou同 hold.Given this， 
wc considc1' an cstilllation stratc色γwithno 1'cquirclllcnt of a pr-iοn仁lassi自cationof p1'ivatc 
and public goods‘detai!s of which will be discussed in the subsequent sections 
l¥正山o仙)凡爪、
C引ons刊umJμJt山l山onS悦etωS0ぱfp汀山I'l¥;口、va抗tea削n川dpubl汁!ic白 goods for a household H E 冗， ¥¥"h8r8 'i 冗 → N 
and仁冗→ Ngive the lllmrl同rof private alld pub!ic goods for household H. Sillce the 
total nll111bcr of goods in thc cconollly is fixcd司 thcconsll111ption sct for al thc hOllscholds 
is JR:" JR:i(1J) X JR:c(1J) for any H ε1-l. Furthe1'， we let Y 冗→JR:+be the lllapping 
froll the household index to the household incollle. To Silllplify the notations， we shall 
henceforth focus on a particular household so that we can drop the argument H until the 
ncxt sc仁tion.
Lct ri ={1，..， i} and rc ={れZ十1，ヲ J 叫叶}bc thれ山iいCX配削t臼sof J下p戸〉町)l'n
呂0ωods1'e剖叫S可pe町川ct凶J土iv、マ叫ぞ叶叫ly.For each lllelllbe1' m ε {h， w} of the co 叩 le. ¥"e defi 肘 TI'" ι 三 {m}xn ι to 
explicitly distinguish the consulllption of p1'ivate goods by diffe1'ent individuals. Further 
we let p E ß(JR:~+) be the row price vector of the n goods， whereム(A)日 aunit simplex 
for a sct A. ¥Vc dcnotc by p' and pC thc pricc vcctors of priもatcgoods and pllblic goods 
w仙 p二 (p¥1/)二 (pト..，p"p川町 ，Pn) 
Each lllelllbe1' m ε { ω ，h}has a cardinal ut 出ty function [ 川 : JR:'t-x lF:え → JR:+ 。羽Wマhi虻叫ch1 
1阻sst1'ictly i日llc1'モeasmgι，st1'icぐtせ廿は.¥yマ conca出、vぞ巳， and t、研ice cont仕inuouslydi旺守町rぞ町nt仕iableぞf面unctionon 
JR:~. S飢1山附帆q中叩lド刊u附l
For mε {h，'wト¥"clllakc thc following assulllption 
Al: rm is weαkly sepαmble froll nc in Um. In othe1' words， for any j， kεrrm and anv 
lεr， 。/θU"'/θzTVA
f〕zj¥δum/θTi:') 
¥"1日 eT'J and J;~n are the jth and kth components of the vector of川、privategoods 
consulllpt旧n:rmε JR:'， and .T1 isthc 7th cOlllponcnt of thc vcctor of pllb!ic goods 
consulllption :r'ε陵、 ¥Vcusc sillilar notations bclo¥¥" 
A2訟 Thcc叩C01川叩 l長C1目scoll即ect刊川f行吻う
by the co叩 leis Pa1'eto-ef五山ntso that‘given the b吋 getconstraint fa凹 dby the 
couple， UW cannot be increased without decreasillg Uh andυzceりeT8α
In words司 ASSll111ptionAl statcs that thc lllarginal ratc of substitlltion bctwccn any 
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two private goods does not depend on the level of the public goods consumption. Hence， 
xm is determined only by the price vectm of private goods and the total expenditure on 
privatc goods fm m. This assl1mption allows l1S t.O fOCl1S 01r analysis on t.hc spacc of 
private goods. 
This assumption is plau日ble.Since the characteristics of the private and public goods 
are巴enerallyvery differellt， there is no strong reason to believe that the level of public 
goods consurnption should alter the patterns of sub叫itutiollarnong private goods. Illdeedう
ol1rれmpirical円，idcnccis consistcnt wit.h this a削 umpt.ionas discus配 dlat.cr 
¥Ve require Assumption A2 fm econometric id目1tification. Under Assumption A2 
when the UPF is fixed， any intrahousehold allocation can be uniquely described by the 
slope of the line tallgent to the UPF for that allocat.ion. Hence， we can associate the 
rnovernellt Ol the UPF with the changes in the Pareto weight. Fmmally， for ally Pareto-
cfficicnt. allocat.ion (，i:'"司去hf)ヲ t.hcrc cxist.s a uniquc hr.正仰2
S叩u肌叫1犯叶油chtl凶.(iW， ih， i")is suppmted as follows: 





s.t. pi(;y;w + :rh) + pC:rc三y.
Thc hOl1schold Parct.o wcightλdcscribcs how t.hc rcsourc町csa削rcalloc口ιマa弘itcd羽¥Vl抗t.hint.hcれ、
hOl 
because th ぞ匂"マ are in ef旺Tぞct a cas ぞof s司ingleぞd ぞclslOn 一寸maker.
We shal凶刈日1call the rnaxiI三
a削仙H吋1d恥not. れ t.hc llla蹴制X氾1l仙I
fu川1Il仁t廿l0nsarc con此山t.in凹11018a削nc吋ds刈t.ri、'ct.lyi日n虻仁rcλ剖烏ing，Wx fol日low唱ss日1日it.Fl刊11thれ目r巳ヲ l.vx also s問atis自cs
the followinfi properties: 1 
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumptions Alαηd A2αre sαtisfied. Then， for the house 
hold problem (UW， Uh; 1ノ;λ)，any Pareto e.fficieηt allocαtion (iペ ~î.h ，iC) cαn be suppo巾 d
削 α8olutiontοthe following problem 




げl，ere，f!οrmε{h， w}ノ thep門川te9οd8 8ub-utildg"l1m i8α contumο肌 8t門ctlyiru判制吋
and 8t門ctlyωnca.何 fnnction，αnd Um is a仁川tinnon8.8t門ctlyincnげ1，8~ng， αηd strictly 
qn仏引-concavefnnction. Fnrthcr， rm i8 wea.kly scpαmblc frorn rc削 H江forea.ch m. ξ 
{h，w}. 
1 The proofs fm lernrnas‘propositiollS and themerns are al relegated to the Appendix 
The last part of this propositioll says that the weak出eparabilityof F' frorn IT' at the 
illdividllal level carries over to the hOllsehold level. This is 1l0t a trivial resllt‘becallse 
thc wcak scparability 01' IT' frorn ITm at thc ildiもidl1allcv中1docs not carrv ovcr to thc 
hOllsehold level in general. In the sllbseqllent sections， we exploit the weak separability 
at the hOllsehold level. 
Let lS de五lethe rnargillal ltility with respect to private goods 明 alllatedat a Pareto 
e伍cieltallocatioll-v¥ 仙 slight abllse of llotatioll-by φm 三 δum/θP | (Z叩)ド二(伊走x'川ぺr凡ιヲr川F判)f<お0旧r 
m ε {h礼i"U叩叶'う}.No侃t
ft白ln町ぐcti必lot叫noぱfY，p a剖ndλ 1羽マ、ぞ rnake the f，お削0110¥¥れW、v巾Tl台n凶ga出S出削S日刊ln口凹Ir日pμti山on(ぐ引叩'(泊oncぞ町rningtheぞ ぞ叶lasticityρ of 
the ratio 0三げ，(φfι)-1 of rnarginallltilities with respect toλ: 
A3: The elasticityρ 三入/'tδTイθ入satisfiesρ>ー(1ー λ)-1for auyλε(0，1)‘Yε114 
and ]J ε ム(lR~+) 
Intl1itivclv司 oncwould cxpcctρto hc ncgativc. As入1Il仁rcascs司 thcprivatc goods sl1h 
ltilitv for the wife wOllld incre出 e，whereas that for the hllsband wOllld decrease. Hence‘u 
wOllld also go down since qr and 'l{7n tend to rnove in the opposite direction. Assllrnption 
A3 reqllires that the proportiollal challge il '，t be Sl伍cientlysrnall il absolllte terrlls 
rclativc to thc proportional changc inλIn partic111ar， notc that As叩 mptionA3 is 
violatcd only ifρ< -1， mcaning it cannot hc violatcd providcd thc proportional changcs 
1Il入 exceedthose in~) in absolllte terms. Hence， Assllmption A3 appears reasonable， 
even thOllgh we cannot test it. 
C nder Assllm ption A3ぅwecan show that the rnovement of the hOll同 holdPareto 
wcightλ 同 nhc trackcd hy looking only at thc privatc sl1h-prohlcm dc日ncdas follows 
De白fini比tio叩n1 Th叩れpro川hlcm(いnWぺヲ u川hヘ可ν， Iμ川Lけ)凹 C肌a叫1長C吋dthe]J戸7門2川 tたβ 州 h一proωble行併7げ川y
p戸丸川ro汁巾川hl辻長C目cm(Uω司 UhlEK:λ刈)if thれtお削0叶1I0wing∞凶1比ti旧onsarれ sa川t凶吋 For anv Pa町、toc組問nt
allocat叩 1(5;W， 5;"，5;')， there exists a private-goods expenditure引手 Yand the private 
Pareto weightμε(0，1) sllch that (.y"'， .yh)is sllpported in the followi時 problem:
(5;Wω £〆hι)=a紅I培叩g伊伊maxμ u'W川包卸，(い:r、刈叶ω) 十 (ο1 μ ) u'九竹'(い:r、J勺f
(広:c"叩 J，xhιつ) 
¥Ve can show that the private sllb-problem exists whell Assllmptions AI-A2 are sat-
isficd 
Theorem 1 S1J.pp08C tha.t Al '18 8αt'I8.fierl 101' both 'W anrl h，削 rlA2 '18α180 8αti8.fierl in 
the h01J.8eholrl problern (U"ヘU"司王λ). Thcnァ αp1'zvαtc81J.b-problern (ポ¥1.";1司/1.)印刷
F1.1'tI日1'， θμ/θλ>0 holrlsザαnrl071，1ザA3holrls. 
Note here that p isa fllnction of]J， Yandλ， as is clear from the constrllction ofμprovided 
in the proof of Theorern 1 in the Appendix. Hellce‘after controllillg for the challges in p 
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and Y， we only need to exarnine the changes in the private Pareto weight I in order to 
follow those in the household Pareto weight入
¥Vc madc可A倒 umptionsAI-A3 to cnsurc that our structural-form modcl has a mcan-
ingful interpretation. Under these assumptions， the household Pareto weight入andthe 
private Pareto weightμmove in the same direction. In other words， the wif，ぜssub-utility 
I町 reases(a川 theh山 hand'sutility decreases) on a gi刊 n山 l町 pc削 ihilityfro山町 (CPF)
for the private suh-prohlern， ifand only if the wife's ut.ility increases on the引lrrespond
ing CPF for thc main prohlcm. This allows us to idcntify thc rclationship hctwccn thc 
distribution factors and the Pareto 官eightλinthe main problem. However. even if 
these assumptions are violated‘our reduced-form estim川町 stiloffer some ne官 empirical
五ndings
It sl寸h山o川u叫Ida叫Is制帥ohe p'附削o印〕孔int此e帆吋dout此 t仙ha瓜t二A主S制附弓引u旧lIIl叩I円p刊)此ti山on凶l~時s AI-A3 are no S山t仕1'0旧n培}日4択卯卯e臼凹r可 t山ha仙nthe I悶  
S町附川れ川、t0ぱfa剖耐S同sumpμt削
ぞxpenditureand private goods expenditure for each member as a Hicksian cOlllposite good. 
Ho官ever，a well-known suf五cientcondition for the existence of a Hick日目1composite good 
削 t附 thatthe relative prices of al the (引ωo仙〕
This 仁口∞ondi比ti旧on1目sCX対tr陀c叩T立沼~m(れd、~Iy r配'Cれ、市刊Sはtr吋ict吐i日、V中(、，a剖1l(吋du旧11出l日ikcれlytωo ho叶Idin p町r前 ticc2 In our papc円ωr¥
J 
札wcsimply r円luccthc prohlcm to thc privatc suh-prohlcm hy Assumptions Al and A2， 
and provide meaningful interpretation of the private sub-problem by way of Assumption 
A3 
4 Estimation Strategy 
4.1 Reduced-Form Specification 
Thc privat←goods allocation in thc houschold prohlcm (U'"ヲUh;y，λ)can bc山 l町内1to 
thc privatc s山 -prohlcm(-1λ 'uh;νぅ".)and thc d凶時開 111λcanhc traccd hy thc changcs 
111μunder Assumptions AI-A3ぅasshown in Th刊 rell1. Hence， the allocation of private 
goods is deterrnil1ed hy the prices p' of the private goods， the expenditure on private goods 
y(二 Y-p'J;')， and the private Pareto weightμA natural candidate加 apr低~y rneaSllre 
of JI is thc wifc's sharc in thc privatc-goods cxpcnditurc， which wc shall call thc 8hα門ng
r1J.le. Thc sharinド'ulcis dcfincd as ，'; = (1内初)y-l= y'"νi二 y"'(y'"+ yh)-1ヲwh目 Cym is 
the expenditure on m司sprivat←goods consumption for mε {h，叩}.As discussed in the 
l1ext sectionぅourunique data cOl1tain the direct rneasurernent of ym al1d thus 8. 
¥Ve assllll1e thatλis a fUl1ction of di8かib1J.tum1，αdο'{，8 z， which include the l11l1her of 
childrcn in our study. ¥Vc allow somc of thc distrihution factors to hc prcfcrcncc shiftcrs 
Ho¥vcvcr司 incmpirical applicationsヲitis oftcn difficult to distinguish hctw問 nprcfcrcncc 
"¥九Teis and Sharir (1978) discusse a slightly 1削 restrictivesufficient condition for 
Hicksian COlllp仁sitegoods， but their condition is stil v目 yrestrictive 
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shifters and distribution factors， and sorne variables rnay be both preference shifters and 
distribution factors. Therefore， sorne structure rnust be irnposed for identi払:ation.¥Ve 
irnposc t.hc dist.riblt.ion fact.ors arc shα1"-ing-1"ule ncntml， which is dcfincd bclow 
A4: The distribution factors z are sharing-rule neutral if the sharing rule can be written 
出 S(]J包 νμ(λ(z)，P， Y)). 
In other words‘z rnay affect the preference structureうbutit affects s only through the 
changc弓1Il入 Thcfollowing is an cxarnplc of a sharing-rulc-ncutral prcfcrcncc shift.cr 
Example 1 Sn]J]Jοe刊 eo.chmε{h，w} ho.s 0.loq-l-ine削 ]J1"cfc1"Im.ceof thc f017n. a'" In :);'" + 
(1 日)In:l人 l川here;ym ε114αnd :);0 εR十附 rn'8抑制αtc-gοdand 1河川トgood
consuηl]Jtzon陀 s]Ject附 ly. Weαssnrne the川 rnbern o.f childrenα:.fj町 tsboth the ]Jre.f 
eren町 pαrarneter白川 α肌ηdt抗hεl加M削 n山Jseh
υ叩j門te日川η'(か川1)二 吋(t~lg引(川 foイ《οず~げr 8ο州rne(ο州nstωα削n川B吋t吋(t~lα仰肌L川川Tη111 s刈ο川 efρη川Lη肌(的ο州ng以(.). Th附附併刊T叫1， 叩附，打，h削(αl/ue
釘二 λ山吋~'(似λαtr!十 (ο1 λ刈)白tわ)-1T，η'he うch川αηgιωs)削η口 α:.fjedss only throuqh thc d川町/附川 λフ
and not throngh those -inα'" -in tI川町川 Hence， n -i8 a shα門町1-1"ule-nentml]J1"I作Tに町e
shifter 
With the sharing-rule neutrality assurnption，研ec札nconsider the following reduced 
forrn specification 
8th 二九+.3，1吋 HT+ ~ !32.j Inpj.HT + f(μ)+日7
yモ
Q 
(30十品InYIIT 十~(12，1 In]Jj，1iT + ~ .5，jZq，11T +ω (3) 
yモ q=l 
where YHT‘Pj，Hn and ZqヲHTare respectively the expenditure on private goods， the price 
of t.hc .it.h good， and t.hc qth dist.riblt.ion factor at timc T for houschold H. Furt.hcr， 
f : (0，1)→lR is a monot.onic funct.ion司王 t.hc "Iatcnt" sharing rnlc， and fHT thc crror 
term. :'-Iote tl凶.51目sdo山lち~. マ悶
、Wils伺-洞ubse削qu同entlych日q町亡kt叶h同epre引、valいq町n亡eof the ce町n討刷帥OI'lIl目 (り}正f斥 and its conse刷qu同ences.The 
reduced-forrn sJ州 i五cationin Eq. (3) is sirnple and straigl凶町ward，and the estir凶 ted
仁oc伍口叩t.shavc a st.raightforward intcrprct.at.ion 
Thcrc arc fivc points t.o makc hcrc. First司 bccauscμdcpcnds on incomc 1七wcincllldc 
the logarithmic income in the set of regressors z. Second‘because S is homogeneous of 
degree zero in Y and pぺwernust have: 
.3， +芝山二。 (4) 
yモ2
which can be used to test the validity of the reduced-forrn speci五cation.
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Th町ird，tl 悶 e I臼sp'川川o冗te凹I山 a刈l汁巾日Iyan e印n凶i
¥vorncn ¥Vl目shto havc morc eh止ildrcnthan m れ旧nin J apa削n.Ace刊ordingto thc Pllhl日leι Op孔川1日mon1 
Sur日、中yon thc Social Awarcncss for Ycar 2002 eondllctcd hy thc Japancsc govcrnmcntヲ
the desired fertilitv is 2.71 for married women with children and 2.33 for those withollt 
children. The引lrresponding五日;uresfor rnarried rnen are 2.69 and 2.24 respectively.:l 
He町札 11<-1町 children in t壮h陀eh，り叩}川附us悦eho叫Idrn町 }附 d小1肘 to won山日附er山 (何u凶 b川討附附q町en;、vable吋)s刈tro肌n
harga削1日n止山mgpo、W、;vれ目l'I日inth(れ、 hOlls配chold，、W、vhi仁chalso t れ旧Jl(吋dsto ra剖ISC/μI. In this casc， ZHT and fHT 
are correlated. ¥Ve shall address this problem with instrum目ltvariables for the nllmber 
of children 
Fourth， while Asslllnption A4 isnot weak or testable‘we can stil interpret the reslllts 
when the sharing-rllle-nelltrality asslllnption is violated. In sllch a case‘the estirnated 
impacts of Z on thc sharing rulc ean hc intcrprctcd as thc "sharing-rlllc-nclltrality cquiv-
alent.'司 Thatis， we attribute al the impacts to the changes in the Pareto weight， even 
though the observed changes in the sharing rule may be partly due to preference changes. 
l¥ りtehere that the pref，長ere町n亡e ト討叶;hif丘te引rsare typl虻亡alりyア1品'IH叫ore町din the literatれu江re.For ex 
aln叫Iple，Blund伽制q叫1et al. (2005) irn叫pl目虻m亡1此川tlyas判討引1凹
th(れ、 Parctowcight and not thc individual ltility fllnctions. In faetヲ thciridcnti自eation
crucially depends on this assumption. If the individual utility function dep目ldon distri 
bution factors (which are also r肘 ferenceshifters)， their ide伽町n凶1
"¥vor此k、官i抗thouta蹴吋κ.di此tl山on凶a叫1c品L吟哨S叩urnpμti旧on. ¥Vマ1五hi江le0削川urshar吋1Il培g一I叩ule一n同附e引叩u川rtralit此yE品制L附吟叩 rnpμti旧on1時S 
a蹴吋d山Imi比t悦e吋dlりy一strong‘ It 時 S杭仰tl山1le削制 r問附e引制州S叫山;t仕n山1
1m叩plic口it比ly)山 idcin thc叩 lit此山肘c旧~ra爪t
pref，ぞ町rぞ町nceshift ぞ町rs.
Finally， Assumptions AI-A4 are nec開制ryfor using the sharing rule s to identify the 
chan巴esin the Pareto wei巴htλ 日owever，these assumptions are not essential for derivin日
Eq. (3). The reduced-form s 
4.2 Structural-Form Specification 
Despite its sirnplicityうthereduced-forIn speci五cationis not without problems. First， the 
introdllction of thc "Iatcnt" sharing rnlc is artificial and ha句noohviOllS cconomie intcr-
pr川ation.Sceond， thc privatc Parcto wcight /1. changcs whcn 'lJ.m is a伍nc-transformcdう
which is theoretically unattractive. Hen凹ぅ insteadof just linearly approximating the 
sharing rule， we use economic theory to impose additional structure， and transform the 
:lThe desired fertility for ullInarried wornen is on average 1ο叩Cγthanthat for un-
rnarried rnen. This is due to the self-selection into rnarri白 ~e. On aver白ge，how-
everぅ wornenstil have higher desired fertility than men. For further details， see 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-shakai/2-3.html 
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problern so that the rneasurernent unit or the origin of urn does not rnatter 
The structural-forrn speci五cationwe 引lIlsiderbelow has two additional advantages 
Firstヲ thccstimation cqllation for thc structural-form spccification is doscly rclatcd to 
the price independent ge町 ral日 linear(PIGL) prefer問問 (See，lvIuellballer (1975)) and 
risk attitudes of the couple， which provides additional insights into the intrahousehold 
resource allocatioll. Second， besides the引旧ditionof hornogeneity of de巴reezero， the 
structural-forrn speci五cationcornes with additional restrictiollS Ol the引同伍ciellts，which 
¥VC仁anlSC to tcst thc validity 01' thc spccifi仁ation
Let us start with the自rstorder conditions ofthe private sllb-problem. Since the alloca 
tion in the private sub-problem is Pareto-ef五cient‘wehaveμθuω/θ.T/ = (1μ)θu'ι/θIf 
N側， let vrn : 1民+×RL→IRbe the ild問 ctutility fl山;加nωrrespondingto t{rn. ¥Ve u 
the subscripts to denote the partial derivati日、vesof Lり，m. For exarnple‘the rnarginal utili比ty
ofm'山sp戸rivatcgoods cぼ叫X珂pc川れI凶山配凹 1?引(νm.，p〆州Zつ)==δvm(zνjη肌l¥司，p〆川)'η包つ)/θ内νm.Th叩1cn目~I沼司 no侃山tll時 tl川 th叩れ
ma培耶inalllt山廿1出附f叫 d附 cta叫I凶 11凶附ctu凶山tilit匂.yfunぐctior
、官eha、Vマe:





























By totally diH'crcntiating thc abovc cqllation and dropping thc argumcntκwc havc 
[ ょにl|: Y| |合(1u-8) 守lM17; マ|d Iln二三 17 1u| |什乞 |fE17 d131(5) 
We obいI)¥'i、V刊.1山凶yha削Vア噌eLり?;l> 0 ω 匂m時 S抗tr則 lyir町問削a削削S剖1叫I
th叩れ scωnd0旧r心rωndi此t1旧onin thc p町 atc5別叩ub刊仙lcm(nWωJ 川可ν，IμLけ)im叩pl附 1り叫'3品<O. Thl山‘
th叩れ叩cH旺白f五訟k削i主1C1口:icnton 山 凹 pos叫i抗tiv、Vγc.To in凶山l此tcω叫r可pr川川 0川叶th悶c立rtcωCI'口n叫I
le目1日mma:
Lemma 1 Let .T'J (y""， p')be m's M，αrshallian demαnd .function .for privαte good jモIT人
Then.町ehaりe:
り川 n rn 
v1:'Il バ:r:' v そ子= 云士 二空.T7'(ym，p')= (Rm -c;n)モ
vy' oY'" vy" • y山
叩hereR7n = _v，~ym/v;n(> 0)守 αndf，j' ==ν/ITθTT/θυ 
????
No侃tct巾h凶凶at可ザl凹 Jl附 thc in即 Cωcor附 れcla剖削句叫t廿1C口itれ、Vア0ぱfd巾心的1抗いlclれ旧、立I削I
01' rclativc risk avcr5目10n司 w hcn thc priccs arcれ、 fixcd. In our れ旧mp11'1Cιal a削nalysis，¥VC aSlil れ
away the price dependence of R'" as with other studies on risk. Since we do not explicitly 
deal with uncertainty， one rnay object to the use of the terrn "risk aversioll" here. Thell， 
n.m can be sirnply taken as a rneasure of the curvat.ure of the utility function. This 
altcrnativc intcrprctation dOC5 not changc thc 5ubscqucnt anal、515.
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Cs剖1Il日Le引佃削rn山i
Z E れcspれ円cttωo af白f五1Il肘1Ct廿l'a削仙n吋sfおo立)1'口m凶a爪tl旧01凹目sof v川川ηm
Proposition 2 L，行dヲ吋t札.sd，β3ηoフtr行う tがhe行今 βXpβωTηhぱdi付的tれ1L必川7陀む β81，川(αZTlむ，01 p門りαt行 g炉G
行2ゆ'pendi伽t旬T阿行守81川 T阿行 1旬j砂νω叫;凡 二 p向31J?(ωνT川"つ')-1 T，η'he川η仏• 1たβt削 9Iμ1.' -In叫1川(ωjμ1.-1-1) αηd ♂ = 
In(8-1 -1)， we 1，αve the following expression: 
ds* 三
(Rh _ R"') 
一一一-7dμキ+ d (lnu) 
(sRh+(l 円R"')"r' (SRh十 (1-s)R叩)
ゎ (c;'_ Rh)ω7 -(~Y' -R"')ぐ
γJ J"i(lnP3) 合 (SRh十 (1-s)RW) 'T" "， (7) 
Pnrther，α88wning tlwt Irl < 1， and taking the T.何，1mαpprOX"Tnαtumο1Eq 仰，we 1，αve 




wl川"R 三 2-1(Rh+RW)ァ γ 三丘 l(Rh-Rω)ノ必J 三 8Wj'+ (1 -s)ωjァt三 2-1 - s， 
d内 =ω?ω;t守九三Efcl守αndcj三 2-1(守+可)
A fcw rcmarks on Eq. (7) arc in ordcr. First， notc thatθダ/θ/1*> O. Hcr削~， aftcr 
controlling for In y and In p'， the changes in ♂ reflect the changes inμ本 andthus the 
changes in μ。Thesensitivit:v of ♂ to 1*， therefore， depends on the average of the relative 
risk aversion for the cOllple wei巴htedb:v the private expenditllre share of the other rnernber 
of the cou ple 
In gcncralヲwhcnboth mcml陀rsof thc cOllplc arc morc risk町川町ヲ 8'is Ics 配 nsitivc
to the chaniies in μ* Risk averse individuals have a high marginal utilit:v of private goods 
when their consumption of private goods is low， As a result， when the couple is highl:v 
risk averse‘a trallsfer frorn the relativel:v better~off to the relatively worse~off drarnatically 
increases the utility of the latter. This， iltlrIl， rneans that the UPF for the private sllb~ 
problcm is vcry concavc. Thlls司 thcchangc in thc slopc of thc linc tangcnt to thc privatc 
UPF translates into only a small change in 子。
Second， inaddition to the changes in μ2¥sネ isalso afぞctedby the changes in y and 
p'. The response of 8' to the total private目。odsexpenditure y isarnbi日;lOUS.It depellds 
on the di征erencein the relative risk aversion between the hllSb剖ldalld wife. l¥otice here 
that thc marginal ltility of privatc goods cxpcnditnrc wcightcd by thc privatc Parcto 
weiiiht must be equated so thatμ切りf=μhV(;.¥Vhen the wife is more risk aver問 thanthe 
husband. a凶 μa凶 8a町 fixed‘v:ytends to decrea田 fasterthan り~ as y go附e剖SIp. Thu 
III。ルrto附 to問 μ~y二 μ吋町 srnust io down so thatザ山1州側 aM17加::reases
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Thc cffcct of priec p' on " isalso arnbigl1ouS. ¥Vhcn t.hc wifc is rnorc risk avcrsc t.han t.hc 
husband， the rise in the prices of goods for which her incorne elasticity is 10官 andher 
share in her private-goods expenditure is high tends to increase s. 
Th凶， the sharing rule a除ctsδ♂/δ1['when the husband仙 dwife have d晶 rent
coe伍cientsof relative risk 品'ersionas irnplied by Proposition 3 below. He白Il(明q札.th日er凹q叫la 
t則
which rne帥a剖n出I凶st仙hatone can t凶akeイ〈白:巴 t山hぞr問e吋du肌1犯C引吋l-f，おor口rne凹S坑凶tir日natio河mrぞ凹sultsonh、va出sd凹削C1"lめb元泊II凶ngthe 
ave白ragぞ配latior凶 ip.Proposition 3 also sl 
to the PIGL prefe臼町l'可e凹ncefor both the husband and 官i汀fe.
Proposition 3 Thc j，οIο叩inqth円沼 ωηrlihonsα1"Ccq削 1!(J，lcnt
1. T，η'heう 仰φ'，C附zerη川b吋t(Rh"釘+R庁?旬ωぺ"(1υ1-8吟叶)リr10川ηd/1.* 削 rγ仰O句伊p仰}対κ川机刷fじO仏削州)弘)，')人附守Sち叫州2
th恥(ιゴ守81幼ちJ仇h川fα川』川川7門1Tη吋hげg門川1.たイιうS札守 抑制αtcc:Epcnrlitnnう払 ο1"p門a8p'
2. There isαconstαnt R s'uch thαt Rh二 Rω 二 R
8. vm(ym，p) hαsα PIGL .for肌 αnrlthe conple hαsα cornrnon coe.t芦ciento.f relαれ町
riskαυersion wdh respect tοym. In othe-r woγゐタ joreach oj mε{I仏 h}，we can 
writevm α削β v円川ηm吋l刊(ωνfηmヘlヘ‘J♂川p刈》オ) 二 α m吋(]ωp刈}冷)片c巾:(ω?νy"η川7
M α CRRA 山 J山IJ!ρ}川川I.C川ctが2ωOη c(ωUη'";R) 二 (ω引m吋)1-R_ 1り)(υ1 -R)-l ザR 共1. αηd 
C吋(ym;R) 士 In νグy'fn打川凡ιザR 士 1 
Tu derive an estirnation equation， we no官 replacethe srnall variation by the withirト
sarnple deviation in Eq. ( 針。Forexarnple， letting H a 凶 T be the s叩u山lbs胤(口叩;1"1中削ptωsfor household 
and ti1胤 and九三十2:;=18HTぅ1刊 replaceds' byお ;I7三寸1T一花 Sirnilarly，we let 
In YH and InPH.j bc t.hc rncan for In YHT and In1ヰ川 ovcr t.hc obscrvat.ion pcr川 ls，and 
rcplaec d (ln y)and d (ln pj) byムInYHT三 InYHT -ln!lH andムInpj，lh 三 InJ.らT，]-lnJ.ら3
Further. we assume that. after controlli時 forprice cha時間， μ'k-T can be explai町 dbv 
the changes in a set of explanatory variables {zム---J27}‘sotl凶 μLT士山十'";/0+ 
ε ?二i づf ム3 1 7 + Z J E j ム11 Jij + 111h， where TIHT is an error term. L 刊州削tねl叫I
(υ1 十 Cほxp( 五弓;lバ刈)リ)-1ヲWれh品町アれ t.hc fお削0叶1い0羽wmgcs叶則t1山 U川山l(臼o叩)
sSTT 三グo+ ~ン?ムzL+ ヨ21;11 + ~ン;EIIムzjI7 十品川1T 十乞131ム InpJ + 
q二 i q=1 7εl 
3jZHムInJij]+乞 [3;t~1s In Jij +恥 HT，]sInpj +駒T-fT，jtTfムInJij]+句T(9) 
JεlIi(H) 
Comparing Eqs. (8) and (9) (See the Appendix for the details of the d目 ivation)，we have 
the following restrictions on the coe伍c1ents:
壁土34=」-(=7)
3i pi+34 





Furthcr， sincc 8 is homogcncous of dcgrcc zcro in 1 and ]J人 wcml1st havc 
ゐ+27iニz1二2二ι1j二E二再現二2ン44 ??? ょ?
]E JE~ Jε][i(H) yε=i( ff) Jε][i(H) 
As with Eq. (4) in the re伽 ced-forrnspeci五cation，Eq. (10) a吋 Eq.(11) can serve as a 
SpCCl自cationtcst. By simply tcsting rニ O司 wccan also tcst whcthcr hoth thc hushand 
and wifc havc a PIGL indircct l1tilitv fl1nction with a common coc伍eicntof rclativc 
risk av旧日on.While the PIGL indirect utility function is not required for our empirical 
analys民間dorequire Irl < 1 for Eqs・(8)and (9) to be a good approximation of Eq. (7)。
5 Data and Measurement Issues 
The primary data source we use for our empirical investigation is the .J apanese Panel 
Survey of COnSllll時間 (JPSC)collected by the Institllte for Research on HOllsehold Eco-
nomics. ¥Ve lse the nine rollllds between 1994 and 2002. The JPSC sarnple llses strati五ed
two-stagc sampling; Thc cntirc cOl1ntry of .Japan is dividcd into cight hlocksヲcachof which 
is further divided into large citiesぅothercities， and towns一一目{ceptfor the Shikokll block 
in which there is no large city. There is thllS a total of 23 strata with a total of 125 enll-
rneration areas distribllted 0刊 rthese strata in p刊 portionto their estimated poplllation. 
Thc data wc l1scd contain two cohorts; Cohort A consists of womcn agcd hct川'ccn24 and 
34 at thc timc ofthc自rstsurvでyin 1993うandCohort B consists of womcn agcd h什川'ccn24 
and 27 as of 1997. The qllestionnaire for each rollnd has core qllestionsうindlldingthe de-
mographics and the edllcation of each falllily melllb目ぅ employment，income， expenditure， 
savlngう andtirne lse.' 
¥Vc took a suh-samplc of dOl1hlc-incomc marricd cOl1plcs cohahiting at thc timc 01 
01明 rvation，which accol1nts for ahout a third of thc wholc samplc of marricd cOl1plcs in 
.JPSC. ¥Ve exdllded the records with lllissing vallles in the variables of our interest. Since 
the stl'llctural-form estilllation reqllires lS to calclllate within-sample deviations， we need 
to have a Sl伍cientnllmber of observations for each、刊man.Hence， we decided to lse the 
rccords for womcn with at lcast thrcc ohscれ'ations.As a rcsl1lt司 wchad 2う0790hscrvations
and 412 womcn. Ahol1t 20 pcrccnt of thc latt目 g品で hirthto at lcast onc child within 
the observation periods. I3ecallse of the delllographics of the women in the salllple， their 
children are relatively yOllng. The mean and standard deviation of the childうsage are 8.4 
and 3.9 respectively. Hence， the children can be safely considered as dependents 
Thc cxpcnditurc scction of thc .JPSC qucstionnaircs has two ωmponcnts. In thc fir叫
ωmponcnt司 thcql1cstionnairc dircctly asks ahol1t thc“hcncfieiary" of thc cxpcnditurc 
In other words， the respondents a1e asked to break down the total expenditure into the 
4Fnrthcr information on thc .JPSC data can hc oht乱incdfrom thc following wchsitc 
http://www.kakeiken.or.jp/en/index.html 
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Table 1・Descriptivestatistics of the double-incollle salllple. 
Nl111b目。fehildrcn 。 1 2 3+ Total 
(A) Demogmphu:8 
Husband‘s a，ge 34.55 36.46 38.21 39.44 37.50 
Wife's age 31.43 33.90 aっ;).リV。つ 36.25 34.iO 
A verage age of children 0.00 6.li 8.5i 9.01 6.84 
Live with husbands parent(s) 0.20 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.34 
Livc ¥¥叶1，:廿'c'sparcnt(s) 0.03 0.08 。13 0.13 0.11 
(s) Expend山 reじlPY1 ()， ()()() per month) 
Total cxpcnditnrc 22.66 22.10 25.43 25.88 24.42 
Expcnditnrc for hl1sband 4.54 3.i5 4.08 3.94 4.06 
Expenditure for wife 2.i5 2.03 1.96 1.8i 2.08 
Expenditure for family as a whole 14.19 12.21 13.39 13.62 13.32 
Expenditure for children 0.00 2.i8 4.30 4.8i 3.43 
Expenditure for other lllelllbers 1.18 1.34 l.i1 1.58 1.53 
(C) Sαりing(.!PY 1 ()， ()()() per month) 
Total saving 9.93 8.16 8.98 8.93 8.96 
Sa、ingfor husband l.i9 1.66 l.i8 1.5i l.i2 
Sa、ingfor wifc l.i9 1.2i 1.35 1.28 1.39 
Sa、ingfor family as a wholc 6.05 3.99 3.n 3.40 4.10 
Sa、ingfor childrcll 0.02 1.03 l.i2 2.24 1.41 
Savillg for other mernbers 0.26 0.21 0.35 0.45 0.33 
(D) IncOTne (.!PY 1 ()， 000 per month) 
Husband‘s disposable incorne 26.31 2i.06 28.42 29.16 2i.95 
¥Vife's disposable incorne 14.63 12.39 12.41 13.li 12.88 
(E) T川 eu'，e 
Husballd司shrs for leisure 4.14 3.3i 3.55 3.33 3.5i 
Husballd司shrs for work i. iO i.66 i.85 i.82 i.i8 
Husballd司shrs for dOlll凹 ticwork 0.39 1.24 O.9i 1.23 0.98 
¥Vifc's hrs for lcisnrc 3.64 2.66 2.53 2.33 2. iO 
¥Vifc's hrs for work 5.49 4.i5 5.05 4.94 5.04 
¥Vifc's hrs for domcstic work 3.09 5.23 5.32 5.80 5.04 
(F) Wザ'，'88hα問。Ifincorne削 de:rpend-it1J.r行
Private expend山間(凶1'1'側) 3i.18 35.14 29.42 30.5i 31.95 
Private expend山間(extended) 39.58 34.56 31.1i 31.51 33.21 
Disposable illcome (narrow) 3o.li 29.99 29.45 29.43 30.45 
Disposable income (extended) 44.61 43.12 42.69 43.42 43.20 
(G)οther chamcters 
Large city 0.32 0.20 0.19 0.12 0.20 
Small citv 0.52 0.59 0.52 0.46 0.52 
Towlls and villagcs 0.16 0.22 0.30 0.42 0.28 
¥Ioncy mallagcd by wifc 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.80 0.85 
Number of observatiolls 324 408 993 354+ 20i9 
+・ 332.19 alld 3 obs for three-. four-and five-child households 
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amollnts spent for the hllSbandうwife，farnily as a wholeぅchildren，and al other hOllsehold 
rnernbers. This eomponent typieally does not exist in similar expenditllre sllrveys， and is a 
llniql1c fcatnrc 01' thc .JPSC data. It allows l1S to mcas11l口 dircctlythc privatc cxpcnditurc 
ym (and thllS s) withollt arb山 ar耐 taki時間taingoods as private goods. 
We treat the expenditure for the hllsband and wife as private expenditure. The 
r凹es印po凶 e tωo t仙hi目Sql 倒州t
deterrni凹1日lesthe benef品ici凶aryof the expendi此tlre.How噌e引、velうt廿h同eself.巳一reportingllatm問eof the 
da川主孟机!ι川t
for the llnobse目，rvedheterogeneity of respondents in terms of the perception of who the 
beneficiaries are， we can capture the changes in the allocation parameter dlle to childbirth 
after eor此rollingfor the (u凶 1附 rvable)self-reporting effeet 
In the second eomponent of the expellditure sectionぅtheqllestiollllaire asks how IImch 
moncy was spcnt for thc month 01' Scptcmbcr 01' thc snrvcy ycar on cach of thc following 
eleven expenditu間同tegories: (A判)Food， (但D)HOllsingιづ (C町)Utilit付y，(但D)Furn凶1
Ho叩us間叫eho山叫ldU舵同e目n凹1
(H町)COIl日IIlun町 a瓜仰tl山(
c口閃川1χ刃刈cl北la削n附川l1S日8.ST引hccぼ?弐xp肘れ叩n凶di仙tれI昨I配'cd巾lat同ab旬yア 川 tcgoryarc availablc only from 1998. Thc two 
cxpcnditurc componcnts arc indcpcndcntly askcdヲ h叩 ccwc arc l1nawarc 01' thc brcak 
down of each expenditure cate伊 ryby beneficiaries. For exalllple， we kn仁wthe aggregate 
alllollnt of expenditure on clothes， bllt not h肌 VlIl11ch of it was spent on the wife司sclothes 
Theref，旧民 weeannot tel from the data whieh goods are private alld whieh goods are 
Pllblic 
¥Vhilc thc sccond componcnt is thc standard format for cxpcnditl1rc snr刊戸ぅ itis 
inconvenient for analyzing intrahollsehold allocation. Thi阻S1日sbecallse 羽Wア噌eぐ削110叫tc凶.官alcl一
late ν moωr s f:山IIlt出hi日sf，おorllla机tι.It i日salwa可yspo 出iめbleう0ぱfc叩:oursぞ， tω0 刊 bりjぞ町Ctl刊 lya剖S出S司Ig伊nthe 
be附印n肘efie託1ci口1即ι
仁xpc旧叩?立~n(吋di比turc on womcn's dothcs as privatc cxpcnditurで for thc wifc 司 which may appcar 
rcasonablc. Hm刊刊1¥thisapproach can bc mislc削1ingbccallsc thc cxpcnditurc on thc 
wOlllen司sclothes lllay not accurately reft引:tthe wifeうstotal private 白{penditure.In con 




This does 1l0t llecessarily rneall that the wife is shoulderillg a disproportiollate burdell 
of additiollal childrcll for thrcc rcasons. First司。ncconld arguc that wivcs may bc simply 
deferring consumption. This is plansible because various costs associated with money-
sp目ldingactivities may increase after childbirth. For exampleぅitlllay become necessary 
to hire a baby-sitter or use a day-care cellter whell wives go out， because they are the 
prirnary caretakers of childrell il the majority of the Japallese households 
To scc whcthcr wivcs arc indccd simply dcfcrring consnmption， wc cxaminc thc pattcrn 
of household savings. The .JPSC questionnaire asks about the breakdown of the savings 
by the beneficiaries in the same way as the expenditure. He町 e，we can take the private 
saving as the present value of the wife's future consumption in our static framework6 
Section (C) of Table 1 shO¥刊 thatthe private savi時 forthe wife declines substantially 
af七crthc自rstchild. Howcvcr司 thcrcis no snch dcar patt目 nfor thc husbands. Thnsぅ¥VC
h品'enoぞvidenceto support deferred consumption for the wife. 
Se町ぐond，the wife ma可ybe 日llpl郎ysubs凶山ti比tu旧ltingthe 1いe目1出sur配e一timecωJχ泊ons叩umpμti叩onfor the pr吋i一
V刊elt悦ecωonsu旧mpμt
prc 仁V寸idcno cv刊id心lc目nc町町1冗(れ、 fお01'snch snbstitntion. Thc avcragc nnmbcr of daily honrs spcnt on 
lcismc for thc husband and wifc tcnds to dccrcasc as thcy havc morc childrcn. and thc 
decr削 seis larg目 forthe wife. Hence， the wife do凹 notappear to be cOlllpensated for 
the reduction in private expenditure share by longer leisure time. Since the aggregate 
statistics alolle are incollclusiveヲweshall illcorporate the value of leisure time whell cal-
cnlating thc privatc cxpcnditnrc sharc in thc snbscqncnt analysisぅapoint "市 shalldiscnss 
in dctail snbscqncntly. 
Thirdぅonecould also argue that the apparently disproportionate burden of children on 
WI刊 smay simply be due to the changes in the relative contribution to household inc・olle.
It 日 COlllIIlon for 羽¥vor吋此出ki山n叫時g、m刊 IIle印nto s伺何、明"¥Vl司.叫7司1此tchtωo le削S制sd伽1いe引印削III凶
rれdnccthcれけ、吐Ir可羽芯司羽)rkinghoms aft.cr childbi町rth.Thi凹Sヲin t机nrn司 d司，h凶a弘rngcれ、市sthc rclativc carnings 
within thcωuplc. To scc whcthcr this is ind凹
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sitting and cleaning， even though this should be included frorn a theoretieal perspeetive 
That is， dornestic serviees are eonsurned even when the eouple thernselves are providing 
thc dorncstic scrもlCC，日inccthc sclf~provision of dorncstic scrvicc can bc intcrpr川cdin thc 
following lllanner: the couple "hires刊日therthe husband or wife to get dOlllestic s町、lce，
and the "elllployee'司 receivesthe paylllent. As shown by this illustration. the value of 
dornestie service produeed by the couple should be ineorporated when calculating their 
eontributions to the household ineorne 
To cvaluatc thc valuc of lcisurc tillc and dOlllcstic scrvi仁C，¥，"C 自rstcalculatc thc 
wage rate by dividing the disposable incollle by the nUlllber of hours worked per 1ll0nth 
Subsequentl、welllultiply the wage rate by the nUlllber of hours spent on leisure per 
rnonth to evaluate the rnonetarv、'alueof leisure tirne. Sirnilarlv. the value of dornestie 
serviee is estirnated at the nurnber of homs spent on dornestic work rnultiplied by the wage 
ratc. ¥Vc shall hcrcaftcr call thc dcfinitions of cxpcndit1l1'c and incolllc in thc raw data 
set the nαrrow definitions. The extended de自nitionsof expenditure and incollle indude 
pnvate sa、ings，the 、alues01' leisure tille and dOlllestic work. 
As 叶山l(削(
hcc川onH引?九， ona品、中ragc久ヲ 仁clos附れrto onc half u旧11山<吋dcrthc れxt恥れ旧I凹1<1長cddc自111比ti凶on回s.Ho羽¥V円γC旧r司 thc gap 〉
b恥ct同、羽1刊 n thc叩C11l亡ω01llれa町削nc吋dれほxpcnditurcwidcns undcr thc cxtcnd 円1 dcfinitions， ascxpcctcd 
froll the precedinii discussions. Do the extended definitions help illlprove our analysis 
of the allocation parallleterつ Theanswer appears to be a伍rlllative.Under the narrow 
de五nitions，the eorrelation between the wife's share of disposable ineorne and her share in 
pnvatc cxp叩 diturcis 26.1 %. On thc othcr handヲthccorrcsponding自gurcis 30.2% und目
thc cxtcndcd dcfinitions. Also， thc cxplanatory powcr 01' our cconolllctric 1ll0dcls is hcttcr 
under the extended definitions. Hence， froll both theoretical and elllpirical perspectives， 
we prefer the extended definitions of incollle and expenditure. 
The discussion so far highlighted the faet that married wornen with a larger nurnber 
of childrcn tcnd to havc lowcr privatc cxpcnditurc sharc 8HT' It. is not yct clcar司 howcvcr司
w hcthcr thc 10羽，crsharc 8Hr is P 
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日ivenhousehold. Thus， we initially treat al the eleven eategories of goods as if they 
were private. Ullder the separahility assumption， the priees of puhlic goods included 
in PHT w0111d only act as random noisc and thc consistcncy of thc cstimatc rcmains 
unaffected， provided that it is uncorrelated with the error term. Thus， the inclu日onof 
al the categories does no obvious harm to the estimation. 
¥Ve face a sirnilar prohlem for WHT山 whichis a v町 torof the average eate目。ricalshares 
of private goods expellditure. One way to deal with this issue is， a巴加l，to include al of 
thc clcvcn仁川cgOl'ics.HOWCVCI¥this approach is not fl11y satisfλctory. If thc cxpcnditurc 
shares for public goods capture sOllle of the variations inμnot explained by z， then the 
estimates will be biased 
日制問， we also eOllsi仇ral alter凶 tiveapproach il whieh we drop from Eq. (9) al the 
terrns involving WHT，j' This is in effeet equivalent to treatillg W as al ullohserved ralldorn 
variahlc with additivc れ目crro凹r叫山ruc川山山tね削u山1
8プ'2，8ゐ7ら:3， a叫nd3プ4re町lllalllsu旧llaf妊fe町cted.Thi阻sapproach has addi社tionaladvantag ぞ凹s.First， the 
categorical share data， which are available only from 1998， become unnecessary. Seぐond，
W附e1肘e併q円吋dll凶0ωt討刊u叫hリ肘Je肘削ctl日、V刊?叶叫elyマ 仰 l(ω wl仙hi町eh目仰伊oω〕【0刷，dsar凹eprl¥口、刊atewhe凶日附ne倒州S刈tn山1臥I
To i日m叫nplcm山 c叫 thcsl附出a爪t
of n'. Summary statistics and introsp町 tionprovidc somc guidancc as to which goods 
are likely private and public respectively for 1ll0St households. Table 2 presents the 
expenditure share in percentage points by the eleven categories. The shares for furniture 
utility and rnedieal eare do not自uetuatemueh. These eategories， partieularly the五rst
two司 arclikcly to hc puhlic for most houscholds， hccal1sc cv中rvhOl1schold mcmhcr hcncfits 
from cxpcnditl1rc in thc samc. Thcy also appcar consistcnt with wcak scparahility hccausc 
they are una旺8ctedby the composition of the shares for other categories. Thぞaggregatぞ
shar 
Tahle 2 als討刷帥oshows that the 討叶hare附討 fおors【OIl日ecate目(川}江ne倒弓 討引刊uchas f，お【0'り，da旧]](川de刷duea川tl山【on i
t れ旧IH吋dto go l1p 、WNiththc numhcr of childrcn. On thc othcr hand 司 thc sharcs for clothcs 
and footwcar， and housing tc 
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im plies the weak separ可abilityof private goods froll public goods， our three de五nitiollsof 
public goods appear reasollable 
Tablc 2: Sharc 01' cxpcnditurc by catcgorics and thc nllmbcr 01' childrcn Sharcs arc 
expressed il percentage form. 
Nllmber of Children o 1 2 3+ Total 
A Food 28.04 30.82 31.67 32.17 31.08 
B 日。lSllg 14.70 6.03 5.02 4.21 6.46 
C Fllrnitllrc 1.88 2.06 2.54 1.89 2.24 
D Ctility 10.01 9.4.3 8.99 9.66 9.34 
E Clothes alld Footwear 5.58 5.10 4.78 4.77 4.95 
F Medical Care 2.43 2.87 2.79 2.99 2.79 
G Transportation 9.79 8.25 7.90 7.:i1 8.16 
H Commullication 6.20 4.97 4.74 4.79 5.00 
Educatioll 0.30 6.97 10.87 11.58 8.76 
J Rcadillg and Rccrcation 10.38 9.58 8.86 10.10 9.44 
K Oth目 Misccllancous 10.68 13.92 11.84 10.33 11.77 
Number of Observations 183 230 611 235 1259 
Pllblic 1 (C+D十F) 14.32 14.35 14.32 14.55 14.37 
Public I (B+C+ D+ F + 1) 29.32 27.36 30.22 30.34 29.59 
Public II (B+C+D+F+G+I+K) 49.79 49.5.3 49.95 48.17 49.52 
¥Ve can lse these definitions to check whether the sp町 ificationtests are passed. De-
cause the testin官procedurerequires a choice of the definition of private goodsうthespeci五-
catioll tests call1lot reveal de五litivecOllclu臼OlS.Howeverぅtheyhelp us deterllline whether 
olr cqllations arc rcasonablc 
We merged three additional data sets into the .JPSC data. First， since the .JPSC data 
do not cont出npr口 information，we merged the Consllmer Pr口 Index(CPI)ωllected 
by the Statistics Bureau， the :VIillistry of Illternal Affairs and COllllllunicatiolls. CPI is 
available for each of the el引 elexpenditure categories il .JPSC for the capital city of each 
01' thc 47 prcfccturcs. ¥Vc constructcd thc CPI for cach cxp叩 diturccatcgoryヲ forcach 
prefecture， for each mllnicipality size (iιlarge cities， other citiesぅandt開 ns)，and for 
each year by assllminii that the pri凹 ratiosbetween the three sizes of municipality to be 
ulliform llatiomvide il each expellditure category. 
Secolldう wecOlllpiled populatioll estilllates and population cellsuses published by the 
Statistics Burcall to obtain thc population by prcfccturcぅ gcndcrand ycar for cach of 
the 5-year age groupS.7 ¥Ve calc1l1ated the female-male ratio of the age group around 
the respondentsヲ ageand included this variable in the regressors as a proxy for the re-
SpOlldentうsoutside OptiOll il the IIlaITiage rnarketうwhichmay affect the illtrahousehold 
7Thc pop1l1ation data wc uscd can bc downloadcd from thc Portal Sitc 01' 0白C凶l
Statistics of .Japall (http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/ esta七/eStatTopPortalE. do). 
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resollree alloeation 
Finally， we colleeted pref，引;土llral-Ieveldata for each year hetween 1994 and 2002 frorn 
vanous同 lCSof thc .Japancsc 8tatistical Ycarhook (.J8Y). Thc compilcd datasct indlldcs 
a nllmher of indicators that are related to the qllality of the child-rearing environment. 
¥Ve lse these as instrllmental variahles for the nllmb町 ofchildren. 
6 Estimation Results 
6.1 Reduced-Form Regressions 
To asscss variOllS cstirnation is引1C8，wc自rstran rcdllccd-form rcgrcssions with a nllmhcr 
of cstimation mcthods. Thc rcgrcssion rcsl1lts for thc smallcst modcl undcr thc cxtcndcd 
definitions of income and expenditure are presented in Table 3. In order to see whether the 
choice of the definition afIぞctedthe reslllts，官ealso ran the same redllced-form regressions 
llnder the narrow de五nitions，seleeted reslllts of whieh are reported on the left hand of 
Tれわlc7in thc Appcndix 
Thc modcl fit is gcncrally hcttcr whcn thc cxtcndcd dcfinitions arc l1scd. For cxamplc， 
llnder the extended definitions， the coef五cientsof det目 minationR2 for OL8 and FE are 
0.135 and 0.094 respectivel、， aゐopposedto 0.086 and 0.015 llnder the narrow definitions 
Given this and theoretieal eonsiderations， we prefer to lse the extended definitions. "fote， 
howcvcr， that thc ql1alitativc natl1rc of our rcsl1lts is similar l1ndcr thc na1TOW dc日nitions，
so that thc choicc of thc dcfinition of incomc and cxpcnditurc docs not rcally mattcr. 
Our primary interest is in the coe伍cienton the nllmber of children. For example， the 
pooled OL8 reslllts in Colllmn (1) of Table 3 sl
、Witha 2.6 pe肝rcenta目ep'川011此tredlletion in the、Wife'sshare of private expenditllre II旧l日nderthe 
CほX山tれM川C目~I吋C吋d 心H出111凶it川
t れm附SはtcdEq. (4) hy th れ ¥口、Id tcst 札¥V抗川hth れ thr 
The ]J、v;官allle凹sfor thぞ testsarぞreporteda抗tthe bo叫ttωom0ぱfTable 3. In e帥achdefi自n凶1吐itionand 
u附S11日e帥ache伺削S抗tnna瓜叩t廿i山0肌nrne引tl刷1.町 Eq. (μ4) 羽Wマ品制吟 not rejeeted. Hence， 羽weh印a前、Vアe凶 e引肝刊、V1吋
Slg 日伊estth凶川au刊tourω 品白fini凶lItlO凶 of private goo肌吋dsor the r附e削吋d山i
1日11凶appropriatcれ、， at lcast for thc dOl1hlc-incomc samplc 
Thc illlpact of ccnsoring appcars minimal l1ndcr thc cxtcndcd dcfinitions‘hccausc 
only 18 observations are censored at zero and none at one for the dOllble-income sample. 
Cornparison hetween the pooled OL8 and the pooled Tohit in Tahle 3引mfinnsthis 
Under the narrow definition， the pr引'alenceof censoring is higherうhlltthe rnain reslllts 
rcmain l1nafI何tcd
As dis仁l1sscdcarlicr， wc havc a conccrn for thc cndogcncity prohlcm. "famcly司 thc




Table 3: Re日間関ionresults of Eq. (3) for the do山 le一山川nesarnple under the extend 
Colullln (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estilllation Pooled OL8 Pooled Tobit 28L8 FE RE-Tobit FE-28L8 
00 Const.ant. 0.249 (1.41i) 0.283 (1.404) 0.181 (3.070) 0.521 (2.05i) 0.186 (1.511) 2.356 (5.778) 
/hLog. pri. cxp 0.001 (0.008) 0.003 (0.006) 0.005 (0.013) 0.004 (0.010) 0.005 (0.006) 0.024 (0.019) 
iM.. (Food) 0.562不キ(0.190)0.56;')本キ(0.194)0.234 (0.356) 0.084 (0.256) 0.2;')8 (0.216) 0.547 (0.707) 
B (Hse) 0.068 (0.063) 0.071 (0.060) 0.096 (0.098) 0.347料 (0.123)0.171キ (0.073)0.576キ (0.293)
C (Uil) 0.086 (0.108) ト0.092 (0.110) 0.095 (0.202) ト0.157 (0.164) 0.093 (0.123) 0.282 (0.563) 
D (Furn) 0.194同 (0.062)0.193同 (0.063)0.007 (0.104) ト0.098 (0.126) 0.081 (0.079) ト0.805料 (0.308)
E (Clth) 0.010 (0.089) ト0.012 (0.086) 0.130 (0.157) ト0.173 (0.139) 0.070 (0.098) ト0.201 (0.357) 
F (Mcd) 0.043 (0.116) 0.043 (0.112) 0.125 (0.275) 0.054 (0.154) 0.003 (0.125) ト0.257 (0.546) 
G (Trans) 0.455本 (0.224)0.446本 (0.222)0.288 (0.42i) 0.639* (0.279) 0.498* (0.220) 0.371 (0.741) 
日(Cornrn) 0.406件 (0.119)ト0.401料 (0.122)0.417 (0.337) ト0.192 (0.147) 0.266キ (0.12;')0.631 (0.743) 
1 (Educ) 0.409件 (0.140)ト0.402料 (0.139)0.598キ (0.250)ト0.5;')0キ (0.254)0.364キ (0.157)ト0.727 (0.554) 
J (Rec) 0.4;')0件 (0.144)ト0.4;')2料 (0.141)0.0;')8 (0.250) 0.031 (0.243) 0.273 (0.168) 0.775 (0.652) 
K (Oth) 0.167 (0.160) 0.177 (0.163) 0.133 (0.257) 0.141 (0.277) 0.167 (0.189) 0.423 (0.620) 
33# children 0.026料 (0.003)0.026料 (0.003)0.024* (0.010) 0.026* (0.011) 0.027料 (0.005)0.103 (0.067) 
Felllale Ratio 0.137 (0.231) 0.136 (0.223) 。060 (0.402) 。015 (0.735) 。032 (0.317) 0.423 (1.758) 
Log. inc. 0.002 (0.013) 0.003 (0.012) 0.005 (0.022) 0.023 (0.018) 0.017 (0.013) 0.020 (0.057) 
Inc. share 0.366件 (0.030)0.36;')件 (0.027)0.384件 (0.052)0.423料 (0.04;')0.389件 (0.030)0.446料 (0.103)
Obs. 2079 2079 673 2079 2079 673 
[(2 0.13;') 0.143 0.094 0.060 
Eq(3)， Pr.1 0.957 0.988 0.826 0.754 0.743 0.450 
Eq(3)， Pr.I 0.349 0.337 0.697 0.475 0.398 0.334 
Eq(3)， Pr.II 0.130 0.141 0.800 0.206 0.136 0.140 
!¥ot.c: 8tandard crrors in parcnt.hcscs. Robust. standard crrors for Poolcd OL8司 28L8ヲandFE 
， 8ignificant at a 5% level 
判。 8ignificantat a 1 % 1引モl
in whieh the number of children was instrurnented. The 28L8 re 日re 号明S10ne引stirnateselre 
叫 )ort快e刷吋di山nCo叫II旧l日11山I
¥ト havc llscd as ins刈trnmれntal 、a町riahlcsthc numhcr of c生也hi日Idrcnthat thc 羽wifc羽¥va削n此ts
to have8， and the J8Y variables that proxy the quality of the child-rearing environment.9 
¥Ve argue that these are、alidinstrumental variables. The desired f，目tilityonly reflects 
the prefereneesぅandis unlikely to be stron巴Iy引lrrelatedwith the unobserved bargaining 
power. The quality of the ehild-rearing environrnent is likely positively correlated with 
thc numhcr of childrcn 
However， since the location of residence may be determined by some bargaining pro 
cess within the household， itmay be correlated with the unobserved bargaining power 
He町 e‘wecarried out the seme test of overidenti五cation(Wooldridge， 1995) f，ωthe 28L8 
即日r制削n.The x2-stat肌 efor th日 testl ls xL 二 18.13 w凶 the ωrre伺叫Sp刈【o河I凶 III叫培gρ一ベ、V刊ra山L
0ぱf0.153. Hcnc刊c‘羽wch凶a旧、中 n凶os叫tat札IS刈ti配c沼a叫1cvi(川dcnc刊cthat q叩ucれsはtl旧on目sthc、a削1山l日id心itれ、Vア 0ぱf0川uげrm一
stru旧Ime目ntal、ariables.Further. we could not r句ecta robust Hausman test of endogeneity. 
Hence， the endogeneity of the number of children do not appear important our estima-
tion. lndeedぅthecoefficients on the nurnl同rof ehildren fm the OL8 and 28L8 regressions 
arc similar 
Cp to nowぅ wch品'cpoolcd thc samplc， and ignorcd thc rcspondcnt-spccific fixcd-
effects. Let us now examine the fixed-effects (with同 modelreported in Column (4) 
of Table 3.10 This model is particularly attracti、re，bぞcausewe can control for al the 
unobservable eharacteristics of the respondent that do not vary over tirn札 whiehmay 
indudc thc rcspondcntsうsclf-rcporting c世'ctうthcagc di旺crcn仁口 hctwccnthc hushand and 
wif，町 thccouplc's wcalth at thc tirnc of marriagcうandso forth 
As with the OL8 estimate， one additional child is a切 ociatedwith a sharing rule 2.6 
percentage points lower in the FE model. 8in切 wecannot obtain a consistent estirnate of 
a五xed-e百'ectsTobit rnodel， we have instead estirnated a randorn-effeet Tobit modelヲwhich
is rcportcd in Col umn (5). As w此hthc cstimation of thc poolcd samplcヲ thccffcct of 
ccnsoring on thc cstimatcd cocfficicnt on thc numhcr of childrcn appcars limitcd. ¥Vc havc 
also estimated the自xed-effectsversions of the two-stage least square models as reported 
in Column (6). The standard error and the point凹 timateinc町 asein absolute value 
because the variations in the instnunental variables are quite lirnited in the fixed-effeets 
rgrcssion. Howc，中'1， thc qualitativc rcsults rcmain thc samc司 andthc FE-28L8 point 
8This question was asked only in 1994ぅ 1997and 2000. Cnfortunately， there is no 
information on thc dcsircd fcrtility of thc hushand 
"The following instrurnental variables are used: # nurseriesぅ#kindergartensぅ#din-
ics， # primary sehoolsう子学 seeondarysehools， # publie parksヲ#aecidentsう#incidence of 
pollution (al in per thousand people)， student-teacher ratio (8TR) in nurseriesう 8TRin 
kindergartens， 8TR in primary schoolsう8TRin secondary schools and the infant mortality 
rate 
lOThc R2 mcasurc for thc fixcd-cH'ccts modcls rcfcrs to thc within R2. 
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estirnate is not significantly di百'erentfrorn the OL8 point estimate 
Four remarks are in order here. First. the level of ineome does not svsternaticallv af，引:t
thc allocation param川町. Thc coc伍C1叩 ton logarithmic incomc was not statistically 
slgm自cantat a 5% level， and the point estimate was very small. 8econd. our results 
clearly reject the income-pooling hypothesisぅ Theestimated coef五cienton the income 
share is between 0.3;')3 and 0.446， which is both econorniぐallyand statistically signi五cant
A single percentage point increase in the wife's disposable inc01ne share is ili哨ociatedwith 
an incrcasc of approximatcly 0.4 pcrccntagc point in thc sharing 1'11lc aft.cr controlling for 
other factors， includinfi the wif，ザsdisposable income share 
Third， because the wife's disposable income share tends to decrease with more chil 
dren， itis useful to consider the total e百'ectof the childbirth on the sharing rule. To this 
end， we regress the disposable inc01ne share on al the other regressors. 1n case of the 
OL8 modclヲthccstimatcd coc伍cicnton thc numbcr of childrcn is -0.018. Hcncc. thc total 
effect of childb 凶 h on the sharir時 r 叫e 日 about -0札似川.(β03(士 0.026 -O.ρ川0旧18.0.36ω附6引)pe 
age points. Therefore， the eft守ctof childbirth on intrahousehold allocation through the 
chan目制 inc01neshares represents about 20% of the total effect of childbirth. The results 
arc similar for thc FE modcl 
6.2 Structural-Form Regressions 
Let us now turn to the凹 timati叩 resultsfor the structural-form spec泊目tionEq. (9). 
We五rstconsider a regres臼onrnodel in which al the categorical shares w are deerned 
private. We問portboth the (pooled) OL8 estir凶 te，加dFE estir凶 tesn The estirnated 
cocfficicnts forグoぅ/]1ぅ/h， fh， and /]4 arc rcportcd in Tぬlc4， whilc thosc for othcr 
ωcffici叩 tsarc rcportcd in Tablcs 8 and 9 in thc Appcndix. "fotc that thc tcrm fhtH is 
dropped from Eq. (9) in the FE models， because t11 is a constant for each H 
The interpretation of the estirnated coe伍cientsfor the structural-forrn specification 
requires caution. First， the left-hand-side variable is the change in the logit transforrnation 
of thc sharing rulc from a rcfcrcncc point. Hcncc， thc cocf五eicntsrcportcd in Tablc 4 arc 
not dircctly comparablc to thosc in Tablcs 3 and 7. 8ccondう changcs羽 in thc z va町riabl辻cs?百S 
af除T長e町町川ctin凶tra油h(叩間叫h凶叫o)吐ld附 ou附 allo町 at肌 lO叩nt山h山r
a削n吋I川dt山h山r目(川:
ぞchildrenon the intrahous制eholdal日locationcan be posit.ive or negative. Let us take the 
rcsl山sfor OL8 with al心 asan cxamph工 1nthis ca札 whcnt > 0.450田 0.349/0.776ヲ
or五<0.050司 thcmarginal impact of a child is positivc. 1n othcr words司 thcmodcl 
predicts that an additional child can increase the sharing rule， when the sharing rule at 
the reference point is less than五vepercent 
11 ¥Vc also ran 28L8 rcgrcssio即 日例市vcr，thc cxogcn川tyof thc rcgrc問。rswas not 
rejected as with the reduced-form estirnation. Henc札 wetake the number of children as 




Table 4・Ylainresults for the structural estilllation for the double-incollle salllple. Estilllation results for other coe伍CI目ltsare reported in 
Tahlcs 8 and 9 
OL5司 alllV FE. alllv 
fJo Const.ant. 0.006 (0.034) 0.004 (0.073) 
51 # children -0.349" (0.130) -0.384涼 (0.179) 
FCll. rat.io 0.032 (6.998) 7.454 (8.970) 
lnY 0.209 (0.171) 0.220 (0.217) 
inc. sha，re 2.433仲 (0.407) 2.451料 (0.547)
32 t 0.165 (0.193) 
33 tx(# cl山 0.776 (0.775) 0.856 (1.093) 
tx(F，守ll.ratio) -1.954 ( 41.626) -37.538 (53.549) 
t x ln Y 1.601 (0.991 ) 1.629 (1.388) 
tx (inc. share) -2.413 (2.126) -2.687 (3.027) 
54 lny -0.097' (0.047) -0.144' (0.058) 
Obs 1250 12;')0 
n2 0.184 0.229 
Eq(10) / Eq(11)司 Pl'.I 0.001 / 0.112 0.000 / 0.013 
Eq(10) / Eq(11)司 Pl'.I 0.001 / 0.114 0.000 / 0.015 
Eq(10) / Eq(11)司 Pl'.II 0.648 / 0.212 0.552 / 0.007 
Irnpact， Olle rnore child -0.048 (0.024) -0.052 (0.026) 
Irnpact， +1 % ilC. ratio (%) 0.429 (0.129) 0.425 (0.132) 
Note: R.obust standard er!'Ors in the parentheses. 
本 5igllificalltat a ;')% level 
料 5igllificalltat a 1% level 
OL5. Pri. II 1IJ FE. Pri II lV OL5ヲno'1，1 FE. no 1IJ 
0.007 (0.034) 0.024 (0.070) 0.001 (0.018) 0.001 (0.000) 
0.238 (0.190) 0.309 (0.170) 0.185 (0.106) -0.186本 (0.081 ) 
4.495 (6.377) 5.997 (9.584) 6.826 (5.478) 6.864 (5.577) 
0.240 (0.170) 0.336 (0.222) 0.066 (0.127) 0.065 (0.153) 
2.318材 (0.409) 2.196件 (0.;')97) 2.352料 (0.321)2.346件 (0.401) 
0.173 (0.197) 0.008 (0.100) 
0.363 (0.991 ) 0.661 (1.030) 0.408 (0.610) 0.404 (0.;')67) 
-25.491 (39.383) -24.685 (57.907) 45.198 (30.151) 45.415 (30.757) 
-1.914 (1.001) 2.262 (1.426) 1.008 (0.779) -0.984 (0.992) 
-1. 788 (2.170) 1.629 (3.248) -1.317 (1.697) -1.234 (2.164) 
0.069 (0.053) -0.094 (0.071 ) -0.045 (0.040) -0.046 (0.049) 
1250 1250 2061 2061 
0.14;') 0.163 0.124 0.124 
0.147 / 0.838 0.238 / 0.867 
0.147 / 0.969 0.238 / 0.981 
0.583 / 0.524 0567/0.117 0.147 / 0.277 0.238 / 0.388 
-0.037 (0.014) -0.043 (0.021) -0.026 (0.013) -0.026 (0.013) 
0.424 (0.118) 0.403 (0.111) 0.444 (0.116) 0.445 (0.115) 
At the I川 tornof Table 4‘we report the p-vallles for the Wald tests for Eqs. (10) 
and (1). Thc formcr was stro時 Iyrcj川 cdfor m吋品川7此hal心司 whcnthc 心白川lon
of privatc goods is Privatc 1 or I. ThllS， our strllctllral-form cstimation appcars to bc 
valid 0叫， when the definition of private goods is Private II. Even then， Eq. (1) can be 
rejected at a 1 % signi五canceI門下Ifor the FE rnodel 
As we have arglled earlier， the inclllsion of w for Pllblic goods may callse problems 
Hcncc‘it sccms appropriatc to cxcludc public goods from thc cstimation. ¥Vc constructcd 
a model in which the definition of private goods is Private II. In other words， we let 
P三 {A，E， H， J}. In this lllodel， we cannot statistically reject Eqs. (10) or (1) for both 
OL8 and FE rnodels as reported in the rniddle of Table 4う出llggestingthat our specification 
is reasonable 
¥Vc also cstimatcd a modcl with al thc tcrms invol、ingw droppcdヲthcrcslllts for which 
are reported on the right of Table 4. As研iththe previolls model，研ecannot statistically 
reject Eqs. (10) or (1) for both OL8 and FE models， regardless of the definition of private 
goods we ernploy. Henc札 ourpreferred rnodels for the strllctllral-form sp町 ificationelre 
those with Private II w and those with no w 
To makc thc rcsults for thc structnral formωmparablc to thosc for thc rcdllccd form， 
we have compllted the impact of仏ana出吋帥dc耐ld仙1
predicted Lム主号Lア for 問 ch H and ァ‘ lsini the estimated coef五cients and regre 出i o 1I e s i 山 al
811bseqllently， the predicted change in the sharing rule dlle to an additional child can be 
expressed as (1 + exp (弓1+ ß'~;1T ))-l -8HT' ¥Ve report on the sarnple average and the 
samplc standard dcviation of thc prcdictcd impact of thc additional child at thc bottom 
of Table 4. 
The average impact of a child for no W lllodels is abollt -2.6 percentage points， which is 
alrnost exactlv the same as the redllced-forrn estirnates. On the other hand. in the models 
with Private II w， the estirnated品千ra巴eirnpact of the additional child is abollt 50 percent 
highcr in absollltc valllc. Whilc thc di 世crcn仁c in thcsc two po印int此 cs百S叫則t札lma川tcs、市 a剖町r、c too small 
to dra剖1れW、vconcllls司lOns民， a plallsible reason for this dif旺Tぞr ぞ町ncぞis that the (ぐ，ategoricalprh、v;官atぞ
ぞぽ町x珂cp河)el臼叩n凶1
power in the hOllsehold‘which is not captured by no w models. 
In al the rnodels， the predicted impact of children is negative for al or ne 
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specI五cation.First， we can test the PIGL preference by testing 1 二 0，which is straight-
forward， ifone notes that the point estimate of r is i11. Hencιfor the lllodels with 
Privatc II w and thosc with no W， WC cannot rcjcct thc PIGL prcfcrcncc. This rcsult is 
somewhat surprising， but it lllay be Silllply due to the lack of power. In the lllodels官ith
al w九PIGLp町長rencecan be rejected at a 5%， signi自cance1引マ1.but these lllodels lllay 
be mis-sp町i五円1.
8econd. 、Wq 亡ancheck the validity of our討pe町亡if品Icationllsin目thep'川ointestir山lllateof T 
N 
appr刊o刀氏x対山cllua机ti(必10l叫)]to be re削asonably呂伊0ω0肌吋d，the point estilllate of γ lllUSt be suf五ciently slllaller 
than one in absolute value. Given the fact that the largest absolute 、.aluefor the point 
estilllate of r in our preferred models is only 0.094， our speci五cationis indeed appropriate 
Finally， we find that the point estimate of r isnegative， though it is not signi五cant
at a 5% Icvcl in onr prcfcrrcd lllodcls. According to our point cstilllatcs司 rnarricd¥vom叩
are lllore risk averse than lllarried III目1by 4.6 to 9.9 p町 centin the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion. This finding is consistent with previous studies on the gender di旺erence
in risk attitudes in financial d 町 ision-rnakin 巴/ 羽which巴e凹n同e但I刊a刈l日叫Iy五白n吋dt山ha川t羽Wマり凹叩I口118佃na紅reruり旧}町問r問e 
r凹k品町ア中れ目川rS町cthan III叩cn目 (.Jianak叫oplosa削仙H吋ldBc円ωcn口'na8配ck‘1999: D羽¥vycωrc仇tal ‘ 2002可 ℃口rosonan 
Gncc"yヲ2009)，cv叩 thollghthc diffcrc町 crnay 州 Jcndon thc日tllation(8巾 Ihcrtct al司
1999) 
Our structural-fonll estilllation has two advantages over these pr引.iousstudies. First‘ 
while research based on financial decision-making is important on its own， itdoes not 
ncccssarily rcvcal thc gcndcr di旺Crcnccin risk tolcrancc. This point is important hccausc 
rncn and ¥vomcn mav h加で diffcrcntoptions to copc with thc risk， which do not ncccssarily 
appear in the model. For example， itmay be the case that men take more risks than 
wOlllen simply because they have better access to the credit lllarket. Our structural-form 
specI五cationis estimated from the consumption expenditure. Hence， it can better capture 
thc gcndcr di旺Crcnccsin thc仁opingstratcgics. 8ccondヲourmodcl allows us to mcaSllrc 
thc ratio of thc coc伍clcn
6.3 Some Robustness Checks 
¥Vc considcrcd scvcral additional rcgrcssors that lllay affcct thc sharing rulc. In Col-
l11n (1) of Tahlc 5， wc rcport thc自xcd-cH'cctsrcgrcssion rcs山 swhcn thc nll111hcr of 
children is replaced by separate numbers of boys and girls respectively. We自ndthat the 
impact of boys on intrahousehold resource allocation is not旧日nificantlydifferent frcJln 
that of巴irls.¥Ve also tested the avera巴eage of children as町 )0山 din Coh山 n(2). and 
it is not statistically significant 
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¥Ve have also tested dllllIny variables for the presence of either side of the parents as 
叫 )ortedin Col urnn (3). The coe伍口自由 arenot s叩 tificant.Therefore‘otl悶 hm附 hold
mcmbcrsヲovcrwhclmingmajority of whom arc a parcnt of cithcr sidc， havc no significant 
impact on the intrahousehold resource allocation. ¥Ve have also tested the location of 
residence. and whether mo 肘 y was lllanaged primarily by the ¥ 治 as Col Ulllns (4) a旧n町凶ld l 
(σ例5町).'1ωe白叫1此tl町 of t叶he加同悶削凹rIl"¥vaω討S刈tat山i目凶stl亡はa叫Iヤyア 討日叫1刊叩;
、Whe町nwe run po刷(り，led-OL8re 品:re号明SHりnlSII 討叫teadof 五xe刷d-ef汀Tぞcts regre 討S臼lon討hうand the indusion 
of thcsc additional rcgrcssors docs not altcr our main findings 
8ince whether llloney官asmanaged prilllarily by the wife was not significant， our study 
questions the validity of sociological studies focused on the lllanagement of household fi 
nance. This point rnay be particularly irnportant in .Japan where the wife rnanages rnoney 
in the overwhelrning rnajority of households but she does not n明:essarilypossess a rnore 
dccision powcr than thc hnshand. 8incc thc outcomc of thc rcsourcc allocation proccss 
within the household is no less important than the allocation process， the sharing rule 
would be at least as illlportant a measure of decision-making power as the management 
of household finances. 
Our cstimation rclics npon thc羽Tcakscparahility assnmptionヲandthns wc tcstcd this 
assumption hy chccking whcthcr thc composition of pnhlic goods is jointly signifi仁ant
We includ町1the expendi tl町 shar町内 =p;z;/pγofeach public good .JεIT" within 
the total p 山 li(ぐ:-goo似吋dぞぽ町x珂cp河)el臼叩n凶1
Ta川ble5， we have induded al the public-goods shares except for Other Miscellaneous 
Thc cocfficicnts on thc puhlic goods arc not jointly significant at a 5% 1円TCI.Hcncc司 0111'
cmpirical n可sultsarc consistcnt with thc wcak scparahility assnmption 
TIllls far，we haveonlyCOIl日deredthe average impact of childbirth to keep the analysis 
and presentation 日llple. Howe 、マr， the illlpact of an additional child may dep ぞ町ndon the 
IlUI凶I山b附附erof chi山1
th(れ、 S附れ川t0ぱfrcgr叩cs同弓叩orst仙hれ l1川nmhれ目rof 仁chi出ldr叩 sq叩na町r叩cd.Our r、刊CSl叫ltωss油h凶0肌、W、V刊y哨st仙ha川tt仙hcnれcga爪ti日、刊中
impact of thc childhirth on tI印刷f山 pr
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?。
Tahlc 5: Rcgrc岡山1rcs山 sfor Eq. (3)ロ叶1thc 伽 uhlc-ineorncsarnplc undcr thc cxtcndcd dcfinitiOl 
Speci五catlon (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (i) 
B:l # children 0.020 (0.012) -0.026* (0.011) 0.026* (0.011) 0.026* (0.011) -0.057料 (0.019)-0.096料 (0.020) 
Fern. Ratio 0.016 (0.735) 0.061 (0.726) 0.001 (0.740) 0.017 (0.734) 0.013 (0.738) 0.210 (0.998) -0.007 (0.729) 
ln Y -0.024 (0.018) 0.022 (0.018) -0.024 (0.018) 0.023 (0.018) 0.023 (0.018) 0.006 (0.027) 0.019 (0.018) 
Inc. sharc 0.423料 (0.045)0.422同 (0.045)0.426料 (0.045)0.424同 (0.045)0.424料 (0.045)0.412料 (0.059)0.423料 (0.044)
# hoys 0.022 (0.015) 
子学 girls -0.028本 (0.013)
Avg age 0.0;') (0.003) 
Large city 0.027 (0.0;')0) 
Srnall citv 0.031 (0.042 ) 
Wf's parent(s) 0.033 (0.019) 
Htγs parent(s) 0.003 (0.020 ) 
¥Vf rnng rnoncy 0.001 (0.011 ) 
Ph. Sh. B (日間) 0.021 (0.031 ) 
Pb. Sh. C (Util) 0.003 (0.031 ) 
Pb. Sh. D (Furn ト0.030 (0.042) 
Pb. Sh. F (Med) 0.087* (0.041) 
Ph. Sh. G (Trans) 0.044 (0.037) 
Ph. Sh. 1 (Edl1C) ト0.040 (0.027) 
(# childrcn J2 0.022料 (0.005)
Ob8. 2079 2079 2079 2079 2079 1259 1259 
R" 0.094 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.094 0.123 0.100 
Note: Fixed-e百8ctsestirnation. Robust standard er1'Ors in the parentheses. (30， .31‘and (32 ornitted to save space 
*SIgnlacant at a 5%lcvcl 
件 Significantat a 1 % lcvcl 
Despite these iSSlleS， we ral a redlleed-form estimatioll llllder the llarrow de五litiolof 
illcorne alld expellditure for the elltire sample， whieh is reported Ol the right of Table I 
in thc Appcndix. Onc additional child wa可associatcdwith a dccrcasc of 3.3 pcr町、ntagc
points in the woman's share of pri、ateexpenditure in the FE model， and the magnitlldes 
of the impacts llnder alternative speci自cationswere similar. 
We al同 ralthe structllral-forrn regressiolls for the whole sampleぅwiththe main es 
tirnation reslllts reported in Table 10 in the Appelldix. The estirnated irnpaet of Olle 
morc child varics from 2.I to 6.1 pcrccntagc points. Hcncc‘both thc rcdl1ccd-form and 
structural-form sllggest that the impact of the childbirth for the whole sample is some 
what larger than that for the dOllble-income sample. One plallsible explanation is that 
those wives who managed to stay ernployed tend to have higher llllobserved bargaining 
power 
Howcvcr， thc strl1ctl1ral-form cstimatcs fail to p酬 thcspcci自cationtcst in Eq. (10) 
As a conseqllence， we cannot draw strong conclllsions abollt the whole sample. Our 
findings do indicate， ho官ever，that the impact of children on women's private expenditure 
share is stil 1日目ativefor the whole sample 
6.4 Exploring the Sources of the Impacts 
Onr自ndingthat childbi1'th tcnds to rcdl1CC thc p1'ivatc cxpcnditurc sharc of womcn is 
pretty robllSt. Let lS no官 explorethree plallsible explanations官hythis occurs. First， 
Olr reslllts rnay be driven by the relative eh加 gesin the vallle of men and wornell in the 
IIlarna巴ernarket. ¥Vornell rnay lose their market vallle in the rnarria巴emarket rnllch faster 
than mcn aftcr a child is born. This may bc pa1'tic111arly truc whcn thc child is thc fi1'st 
child 
The second explanation is preference change. ¥Ve have assllmed that the distriblltion 
factors are sharing-rule llelltral. Sllppose instead，“wOIllell eherish ehildrell rnore than 
rnell do." This rnay be b刷:aus札 thernore ehildren the cOllple has， the rnore wornell wOllld 
vall1c public goods whilc mcn's p1'cfcrcnccs 1'cmain l1nchangcd. 1n this ca明ぅ cvcnwhcn 
thc Parcto wcight rcmains constantヲthcsharing rnlc may dcc1'casc 
The third explanation is the additional sphere of bargaining. Some allthors sllggest 
that wornen tend to be ernotiollally rnore strongly attached to ehildrell than rn同悶e凹n(Ma心)H叫削o肌)Ily¥
1悶996:Ze帥a加1
tωo h凶d品前、Vマでcmor配れ S問a旧、vln r悶、司川a削1凹S目問1日ingt仙hれ川叩1r仁chi出ld廿rr叩、ヨ~n. 1n 0侃)辻thc削円~r、 羽¥VO印rds，亡childbi孔11'抗thmay c1'catc an 
additional sphcrc of bargaining， which is sl1bstitutablc forヲ butnot capturcd by司 thc
sharing rlle 
¥Ve plt these three alternative (仏b川川lt此 not rn日1l川ua刈l日lye位X対吋dll削USl刊幻n、V噌叫e吋)eほ叫X斗lμ〉汁la仙I凶1<-1川ti削(
For the五r可stex三q中planation，we illdllded in the set of regressors the llllrnber of male and 
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female friends of the wifel2， asa pr眠yfor her value in the marriag;e market. The numb目
。ffriel1ds rnay be a reasol1able p1'Oxy， because it would reflect her popularity al1d the 
l1etwork on which she can fal back il1 case of di刊 rce.Ol1 the other h加ldぅitdoes 10t 
rcflcct t.hc qllalit.y of fricnds‘which may also bc important. AIso‘t.hc nllmbcr of fricnds 
may bc cndogcnollsヲ bccallscthc att.ract.ivcncss of t.hc wifc could po日tivdyaH'cct. bot.h 
the number of friends and the sharing rule， overstating the impacts of the latter 
Despite these potential caveatsうwecarried out regres臼Ol1Swith the l1urnber of friends， 
the results of which are reported il1 Colu山 IS(1) al1d (2) il1 Table 6. N川ethat we have 
t.akcn thc logarit.hm of t.hc nllmbcr of fricnds plus onc，田nccthc nllmbcr of fricnds varicd 
substantially over respondents. ¥Ve added one to avoid taking the logarithm of ze1'O. 
However， the qualitative nature of our results as discussed below is not affected by this 
treulsforrnation 
¥Ve fil1d that the coefficient 01 rnale friends is刊 rysrnall al1d 10t statistically sig 
nificant. In cont.rast.ぅt.hcimpact. of fcmalc fricnds is mllch largcr， blt. not. st.at.istically 
sig;nificant in the FE model. Further， the coefficients on the female ratio， which would be 
inversely related to the value of the woman in the marriage market， isalso statistically 
1I1臼grn払:al1t.Therefore， we lack evidence to support the五rstexplal1ation 
For the second explal1ation， we use the respondel1ts' attitudes towards eight dornail1s 
of lifc司indlldi時 (i)to livc， (i) t.o spcnd司(川 towork司(川t.or削sc，(v) to hcal， (vi) 
to play， (vi) to learn， and (vii) to interact. Each respondent is asked to answer how 
important each domain is on a five-point scaleぅwheresmaller numbers indicate dom剖 ns
valued rnore highly by the respol1dent. Each domain is asked il1dependel1tly， sothat al 
the eight domains can be μextrernely importal1t'ぅor“notirnport剖rtat alう， for a given 
rcspondcnt. Notc that t.hcsc qllcst.ions ¥1中:rcnot askcd in 1994. 
We as日 methat these variables are not distribution factors but preference shiftersう
which are not necessarily sharing-rule neutral. Thus， ifour results are driven by preference 
shifters that are systematically correlated w仙 theshar叫>;rule (and th川凶tsl則 il1g-rule
閉山al)，these刊 riableswould ca]山間 thevariations il1 the sharing rule 
Columns (3) and (4) in Tablc 6 rcport. t.hc rcgrcssion rc間J!t.swit.h t.hc at.titl心svan-




Tahlc 6: Rcgrc岡山1rcs山 sfor Eq. (3)ロ叶1thc 伽 uhlc-ineorncsarnplc undcr thc cxtcndcd dcfinitions 01' ineornc and cxpcnd出 n工
Colurnn (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estirnation Pooled OL8 FE Pooled OL8 FE 
B:l # children -0.027同 (0.003) ト0.028* (0.011) -0.021料 (0.004) -0.042料 (0.013)
F守rn.ratio 0.120 (0.234) 0.063 (0.742) 0.211 (0.254) 0.190 (0.882) 
lnY 0.001 (0.013) ト0.022 (0.020) 0.007 (0.014) 0.020 (0.019) 
Inc. sharc 0.369同 (0.030)0.426料 (0.045)0.350同 (0.032)0.428料 (0.045)
ln((# 五~rn. frd)+l) 0.010本 (0.005)0.010 (0.007) 
ln( (#山1.frd)+1) 0.002 (0.004) ト0.001 (0.005) 
Att川 de(Live) ト0.009 (0.006) 0.008 (0.006) 
Attitude (8pend) 0.004 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 
Attitude (Work) 0.000 (0.006) 0.008 (0.006) 
Attitude (Raise) 0.001 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006) 
Attitl1dc (Hcal) 0.003 (0.005) 0.000 (0.006) 
Attitudc (Play) 0.017料 (0.005)0.000 (0.006) 
Attitude (Learn) 0.007 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 
Attitude (Interact) 0.011水 (0.005)-0.004 (0.006) 
Deci日onson children 
Obs 2079 2079 1880 1880 
R2 0.138 0.098 0.140 0.109 
Notc: Rohust standard crrors in thc parcnthcscs. fJ，りう i]j， and fh ornittcd to savc spacc. 
* 8ignificant at a 5% lcvcl 
件 8ignificantat a 1 % lcvcl 
(5) (6) 
Pooled OL8 FE 
0.025料 (0.006)ト0.013 (0.019) 
0.504 (0.346) 0.769 (1.270) 
0.015 (0.020) ト0.008 (0.026) 
0.339料 (0.044)0.329料 (0.078)
0.009 (0.007) 0.016 (0.009 ) 
100o 100o 
0.113 0.078 
伽C1S10凶 onthe disciplining and trai山 Igof children on a五ve-point scale f川 no凹 (0
th叩れ hllsbm旧I凶 makαcs thc叩 dれ閃削C口IS川 1)to 0肝 (いonly予Yt叶h叩cwifc m山la油弘kαcsthc叩 d心れ閃削C口IS川 1け).Onc problcm 
with this qllcstion is that this variablc is rclcvant only to couplcs with childrcn. Hcnccヲ
we had to drop the obs目、ationswithont children. 
c江h川り叶山山，1山lurn日i日凶I
1羽wアhileth日eC引(り附}附q白亡口1日q町印n凶I此ton the同 dωecαIS削j(り凹仙}江旧nS(り凹仙}江旧nchildre佃n1目Sn凹10此ts刈tati目S抗仰t1C虻ca叫1ヤyア 討日1培巴I旧i止品fica旧n此tin both 
thc poolcd OL5 and FE modclsヲthcpoint cstimatcs arc largc in absolutc valuc， and thc 
signs of the coef五d目ltsare opposite. Frolll the cross-sectional perspective‘those WOlll目1
who have a higher (unobserved) bargaini時 power would be 110町 likel世叫ぞIytωo llal除白 d山ぞ引町叩CISIωon
on chi江Idrenand e肝Iリoya la，削l'可"gersharing rule. On the other 可hand，t叶herernay be su bs叫ti抗tutionI 
bet¥羽W、V刊?噌eenthe sharing rule and decisions on children for a given couple‘as suggested by the 
fixcd-cffccts rcgrcssion lllodcl. ¥Vc also find that thc coc伍eicnton thc nllmbcr of childrcn 
is llluch sllal町 inthe fixed-effぞctslllodel than other lllodels. All of these observations 
are consistent with the third explanation. 
7 Discussion and Conclusions 
Thcrc is a largc body of litcratnrc on intrahouschold allocation in cconomics and sociology. 
50ciological literature has focused prilllarily on financial lllanagelllent in the household. 
Econornics literature， on the other hand， has prirnarily focused on relaxin巴01'testing the 
unitary rnodel. l¥either literature has appropriately studied the impacts of childbirth on 
intrahollschold rcsourcc allocation， dcspitc its importancc. In ordcr to do soヲ ¥vchavc 
dcviscd rcdllc円l-formand structural-form cstimation cqllations blilt upon a collcctivc 
model of the household. ¥Ve exploited a unique data set in .J apan to address a nUlllber of 
econometric issues typically faced by researchers 
As shown bv the sumrnarv statistics. both the husband and wife make sacri五cesfor 
thcir childrcn. ¥Vith thc arrival of thc first child， cach 01' thcm司 onavcragc， spcnds morc 
timc on domcstic work， lc日 timcon lcisurc， and Icss llloncy for privatc pllrpo即日 Howcvcr司
the burden of children is disproportionately on the wifeヲsshoulders，官iththe disparity 
increasing with 制lditionalchildren. The question is whether this ob同 rvationis true even 
after controllin巴forthe ch削Igesin wife's incorne share and other factors. Our empirical 
rcsults af日rllthis. and this conclusion is robllst. 
In both rcdllc円l-formand structural-form spcci自eationsヲ cachadditional child was 
associated with a decrease of at least 2 percentage points in the官if，ザsprivate expen 
diture share， after controlling for various factors induding her share of total disposable 
incorne. ¥Ve considered the possible endogeneity issue due to the wife's unobservable bar-
gaining powcr which is positivcly corrclatcd with both thc nllmbcr 01' childrcn and hcr 
privatc cxpcnditurc sharc. Howcv中止 wcdo not find strong statistical cvidcncc for sllch 
an endogeneity problelll. 
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¥Ve also investigated the causes of the decrease il the wife's private expellditure share 
Our results are cOllsistent with the hypothesis that the reduced sharing rule is substituted 
(or cornpcnsatcd for) by thc 山 Tcascds句ア in thc d恥cc川C口1日ISI削目 Cω削on町lCれ目crningthc陀 d心仙IS町舵悶C1ι'江旬刷jJμ凶〉吐山曲l日i1日凶I
training of the childre目n.Our ernpirical results do not provide support for the explanations 
based on the rnarriage rnarket and pref，町田lcechange， though our results should be taken 
with a grain of salt because the rneasures we use to test these explallations are far frorn 
ideal 
Bcsidcs rncas111'ing thc irnpact of childbirth on intrahouschold rcso111'CC allocation and 
analyzing its cause‘our studv also offers additional contributions. First. we showed that 
a single percentage point increase in the wif，山 disposableincorne share is associat引1with 
an increase of aroulld 0.4 percentage points in her share of private expenditure. Our 
study dearly r句ectsthe il引lIne-poolinghypothesis as with many of the previous studies 
Sccond， our structural-forrn cstirnation allows us to tcst thc PIGL prcfcrcncc司 whichwas 
not rejected in our pref，目redrnodels. Third， our study a¥so developed a way to rneasure 
the gender di旺ぞrencein the coe伍cientof relative risk aversion. Our results indicate that 
"¥vornen are IIlore risk-aver明 by4.6 to 9.9 per伺 ntin terrns of the引同白cieltof relative risk 
前 crsion.0111' approach providcs a cornplctcly ncw way to analya thc gcndcr di世cr叩閃
in risk attitudcs 
Our study also highlights the usefulness of the "beneficiary forrnat" in the expenditure 
survev. The data on intrahousehold resource allocation collected with the "bene白crarv
forrllat" call generate interestillg studies， which were 1l0t previously possible. In general， 
pancl data scts arc rnorc dcsirablc than cross-scction datascts bccausc thc forrncr allows 
us to control for unobscrvablc hctcrogcncity at thc hOllschold lcvclヲ indudinghow thc 
respondent assigns the beneficiary of the expenditure. However， the pooled OLS rnodel 
and the fixed-e旺8ctsrnodel provide sirnilar results for the rnajority of our analysis， though 
Table 6 isa notable exception. This indicates that the cross-sectional allalysis ba川町Ionly 
on onc survcy round rnay providc rncaningful cstirnatcs. Collccting pancl data with thc 
“bcncfi仁1ar:v
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Appendix 
A.l. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1: Note first that [!m is continuous， strictly increasinii and strictly 
quasi-collcave， alld nrn is weakly separable froll nc il [!rn by Assumptioll A1. By Theorelll 
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3.3めbin Blaeko旧rb句)巧y一e併ta刈1.(19i花川8め)， tl 悶 e e位悶X氾ist
quaslト一conca、Vアれ f凸1日l11ctionsnm a削n(吋dU勺rHη S間udι:ht.hat. 
ιアm(:rm，;1C)ニ um(1.m(.1・m)，:r') 
Thcrcforc， applying t.h凹t.ocach of mε{旬、司hトwcI 
Wx(がぺ27hIC)ニ λCω(1."'(:rW)， .yC) + (1 入)[Jh(uh(:rh)ぅIC)
Hcn 肌 a削nvP、aぽ弘U山山r口c仇T北t.ocf旺白f五訟k削i主削C口叩:lcn
orcrn 3.5 in Bla前ckor叶bv、Vア 川 al. (19i刊川8別)ヲ ¥VC C肌削a削ncι:hoosc u川 S別1町 ht.1川 n川 i臼sst.廿r川 lちyアC∞oncavc 
Further， for the .ith and kth COlllpOnel山 llla町 I川 ε lR.~ and the 1此thCωornpo凹
a削n町Iりy:I広.C ε lR.~， tl日 hOllsel川d ltility fllnetion T九 sat出品開
品(応27)=去(叫27)=去(山口)二O
This proves that rn is weakly separable from IT' in VV"， 口
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider a Pareto e 白C 悶 rta刈l汁巾日10川c凶:a川t旧n (υ:i;Wω ， :rザhヘ，:i/:川Cつ).Th 時 a刈l日10川Ce)，t肌l山【on 
Ill  附 S抽削a爪tisfyt.hc first 0即rd目 ωndi此tionsof t.hc III山 a蹴制主:¥，X氾11111
a 日ttleabllse of notation， we have the following for mε {w， h} and a町 lr，12・1:J，14εIT':
θu'flι 
















This is dlle to the weak separable hOllsehold ltility fllnction WA llnder Assllrnption A1 
as shown in Proposition 1 
l¥ow. 1川町三入o"'andμ九三 (1λ)0九州制μ二百先刊向二p'(が'+:1:h).)[ow let 
l1S C引叩COl川〉河n目凹削S目1(凶《
1 t is st.raightfor日wardt.o vcrify t.hat. thc first ord(れ、~r condit.ions for t.hc privatc sl1b 一probl れ旧III
ぐ叩削0叫llCl吋I凶d凹 官Wl凶 Eq (υ12幻)a凶 Eq(ο13川幻).Since um is strictly concave， the first ordぞ町rcω0叫n町凶ldi抗ti(必101叫m
〈引ω仰o旧〕汀r汀r倒叫Iい)(川(り}江旧削ndtωり a UI問 le al( 削 tion in (u"'， u¥ y， 1)
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Let lS now pro刊誌 >0件 A3
δ/" 
δλ (μω+μ")2 。ωρ+λ(1λ)(ゆIゆh_ rþ"'cþ~) 
(μw+μh)2 
φ'"φh (， "， ，，(川 r吟¥¥，( 1+入(1λ)(';:二':1 1 
(μw+川)2¥¥ct'" q¥h) ) 
φ旬。(~ ~/~ ¥ ，-1品行¥(1+入(1ー λ)ψ1こ l
(pW十/1/')2¥/ 
φωφh 
つ三 (1+ (1λ)ρ) (p'" + ph) 
Since the first terll in Eq(14)日 positiveand 1λ> O.we 1 
θJI ~ 1-1 ¥¥-1 >0件 ρ>-(1λ)-1 
δλ 
This cOlllpletes the proof of Theorelll 1口
(14) 
Proof of Lemma 1: By Il句、 identit子 wehave仇Im/δU二 xj'(y，p')・θ円 /θp;DIfH-
cntiati時 thiswith rcspcet to ym and divid叫 bothsidcs of thc cqllality byl子 ¥vchavc 
thc lcllla.ロ
Proof of Proposition 2: First note the following: 
(u f+f)udH二11'灯、V~~ V Y '1/ (等々ト(l-S)Yd(ln己)
( 引，/九L: 引川1ω:U;乙竿戸守Sち十竺L一子戸旦(υ1-8、サ) 
v:' v 
(sRh + (1 -s)RW ) ds* 
d (In己)
Usi時 inEq(5) th日 aswell as dy = yd 1町。 dpj= pjd Inpj， and Eq(6)， we have Eq(7). To 
derive Eq(8)ぅ品rst凶 tieethat the followi時 eqllationfc品川 frornEq(7) 
d8ネ三 ア土-dμ*十J」 (lny)
R(l -rt)' 1 -rt 
ャ|仏j+dM-ddω/ 日|、|~dω÷L|d(lnp)会;'l R(l-rt) ~J 1-rtJ' 'o 
Ta北山ki吐III叫n培gt叶h同e品rS抗t一0印l'(可てde凹rTa勾符y刊ア7101'apI川 Xl日11凶 tion，we ha削、Vア噌eEq(似8) 口
Proof of Proposition 3: 2 二今1.is obviollS. To prove .3 二今 2.，we sirnply need to plllg 
17ニ αm(p)c'(ym)組 (113ニ αm(p)♂(ym)in thc dcfinition of Rm 
To provc 1 キ 2司 notiecthat wc ean writc thc rcciprocal of thc eoc伍eicntas RW + 
39 
8(R" -Rω). This expression is independent of S only if R切土庁ι‘m叶lIchcase we have 
Rω + s(R" -RW) = Rω = R". For this to be ir凶 e叩pe卯ぞ町叩n凶I
COllst同alt此n. Su山1(白htha瓜tn.'ωU二 n.h二 R
To pl'OVC 2.中 3.ヲlctl1S first. kccp t.hc pricc弓fixcd.Tl'ansforming t.hc dcfinit.ion of R， for 




Noti時t.hat.hot.h :ym and v;' arc r州 itivc，¥VC obtain ln v;tニ Rlnym+ cm(p) hy in 
tegrating both the sides over :y， where c吋]J)is constant官ithr凹 pectto income. Then， 
by setting αm(ρ)二 exp(cm(p))，expollent則 1時 bothsicles of the equalit子 a吋 further
凶 eg川 ingOV8r ym; "¥ve have vm(ym，p)二 αm(p)c(:ym‘n.)+ Ir(p)口
Derivation of Eq(10): AftれM川C目~r l'C叩pla削肱肌C口in時 in Eqば(8別)t.hc s目叩拙m凶凶a叫1、v則叩Ja爪t川
sample d 引肝'Ja抗叩tlOnsa叫I凶 t by tll， we can arri附 at Eq(ゆ9)by マ ma池刷kir口m日I時 fお削ollowi川n時 S 山 S日M吋t吋，1抗tl山 0 出 @ 
]0 二 K170十 0(r2)，fJi二klゥf司 ゐ二 klT70J J7jニ丘 1)ゥ，'7 ゐニ γJ
、71 二 ic'サー Ind(jξr(l{))+ (k1も l)!Iwj， 
、7i 二 k lT71 IM(Jεr(Hl)十ic'(r~j -!Icj )!I，凶ソヲ
、71二 ic 1 rciC !IWjヲ 、7iニ丘 ldf3 7司 ペニ丘 ldfJr司 fHT二k'(l十 rt)rlHT
Eq (10) follows fl'Om t.hcsc叩 lations口




Table 7: n時 reSSlon附 ultsfor Eq. (伶3)u吋 e凹rt叶h同enaTf刊削0肌w、?ω品白fini凶tlO凶 of ir山白orIl陀ear凶 e位叫X可p附削削e白印I凶I
parenthe 弓明es
-
8ample Double-Income Onlv Whole 8ample 
Est.imat.ion Poolcd OL8 28L8 FE FE-28L8 Poolcd OL8 
グ。COllstant 2.394 (2.206) ;').927 ( 4.826) 2.607 (3.;')31 ) 3.049 (9.286) 0.362 (1.250) 
ふlny 0.008 (0.012) 0.017 (0.023) 0.002 (0.017) 0.0;') (0.024) 0.04;')件 (0.007)
iM"¥. (F<ω<1) 0.260 (0.294) 0.397 (0.;')94) 0.163 (0.394) 0.86;') (1.157) 0.276 (0.17;') 
I3 (Hse) 0.092 (0.106) 0.169 (0.175) 0.332* (0.153) 0.599 (0.472) 0.016 (0.055) 
C (Util) 0.163 (0.164) 0.747* (0.334) 0.198 (0.282) 1.821 * (0.924) 0.150 (0.096) 
D (Furn) 0.101 (0.097) 0.241 (0.180) 0.078 (0.188) 0.418 (0.503) 0.100 (0.055) 
E (Clt.h) 0.208 (0.134) 0.107 (0.258) 0.631料 (0.202)1.057 (0.578) 0.132 (0.075) 
F (Mcd) 0.145 (0.186) 0.274 (0.461 ) 0.212 (0.285) 0.096 (0.889) 0.089 (0.105) 
G (Trar 0.016 (0.349) 1.064 (0.678) 0.603 (0.401 ) 1.962 (1.193) 0.166 (0.190) 
H (Co凹III山 0.192 (0.174) 0.861 (0.467) 0.201 (0.228) 1.479 (1.211) 0.239本 (0.108)
1 (E山 c) 0.039 (0.205) 0.271 (0.393) 0.263 (0.323) 0.276 (0.886) 0.063 (0.123) 
.J (Rec) 0.213 (0.216) 0.578 (0.391 ) 0.537 (0.359) 0.295 (1.058) 0.395** (0.125) 
K (Oth) 0.443 (0.261 ) O.iiO (0.524) 0.047 (0.433) 0.157 (1.019) 0.099 (0.148) 
/h # childrcn 0.022料 (0.005)0.025 (0.016) 0.023 (0.01 7) 0.091 (0.092) 0.033料 (0.003)
Fem. ratio 0.139 (0.347) 0.363 (0.636) 0.59;') (0.995) 3.799 (2.877) 0.029 (0.192) 
lnY 0.042本 (0.021) 0.006 (0.041 ) 0.009 (0.032) 0.009 (0.100) 0.090件 (0.007)
Inc. share 0.390件 (0.037)0.491 **(0.074) 0.021 (0.074) 0.023 (0.218) 0.260件 (0.013)
Obs 2079 673 2079 673 6962 
[(2 0.086 0.122 0.015 0.058 0.099 
Eq(3)， Pr.1 0.450 0.137 0.557 0.459 0.997 
Eq(3)， Pr.I 0.502 0.204 0.612 0.484 0.797 
Eq(3)， Pr.II 0.453 0.349 0.764 0.340 0.031 
l¥ot.c: Robllst. st.andard crrors arc rcportcd for Poolcd OL8， 28L8(B)， and FE 
ホ 8ignificantat a 5% level 
料 8ignificantat. a 1 % lcvcl 
28L8 FE 
1.717 (2.614) 0.187 (1.793) 
0.032料 (0.012)0.028件 (0.010)
0.4;')3 (0.327) 0.401 (0.247) 
0.079 (0.091) 0.019 (0.090) 
0.541 *米(0.184)0.031 (0.157) 
0.137 (0.095) 0.038 (0.105) 
0.098 (0.135) 0.150 (0.116) 
0.061 (0.235) 0.001 (0.146) 
0.572 (0.370) 0.691件 (0.223)
0.601 * (0.286) 0.181 (0.139) 
0.191 (0.222) 0.439キ (0.21;3)
0.414 (0.218) 0.005 (0.218) 
0.149 (0.267) 0.140 (0.218) 
0.039料 (0.009)0.033料 (0.008)
0.010 (0.334) 0.514 (0.559) 
0.102件 (0.013)0.064件 (0.010)
































OL8， allu， FE. al必
九主 (Food) 2.932 ( 4.362) 2.884 (5.410) 
D (Hse) 1.025 (1.254) 0.151 (1.973) 
C (Ctil) 1.633 (2.832) 2.345 (3.500) 
D (Furn) 0.185 (1.299) 0.656 (1.633) 
E (Clth) 2.638 (1.744) -4.401 (2.350) 
F (Ivled) 3.319 (2.169) 7.223本 (3.331 ) 
G (Trans) 1.334 (5.164) 6.316 (8.826) 
H (Comm) 0.692 (1.873) -3.172 (2.282) 
1 (Edue) 0.469 (3.062) 0.164 ( 4.478) 
.J (Rcc) 1.014 (3.371) 2.220 ( 4.855) 
K (Oth) 4.086 (3.548) 1.0;')9 (5.628) 
36 A (Food) 28.514 (3;').642) 13.180 (;')0.826) 
B (Hse) 4.219 (13.588) 1.483 (20.938) 
C (Uil) ト16.737 (21.081) -11.492 (23.901) 
D (Furn) -1.628 (13.445) 5.663 (17.686) 
E (Clth) -1.306 (14.031) 13.747 (20.416) 
F (Ivlcd) 23.434 (22.943) 2.378 (28.959) 
G (Trans) 99.969' (49.104) -0.262 (102.567) 
H (Comm) 20.086 (20.890) -4.339 (25.778) 
1 (Educ) 56.010 (34.763) 102.791 (54.974) 
.J (Rcc) 32.664 (32.507) 60.031 (43.411 ) 
K (Oth) 12.332 (30.318) 79.463 (53.627) 
37 A (Food) 87.233 (84.697) 14.236 (123.097) 
B (Hse) 10.65;') (43.451) 40.464 (71.297) 
C (Uil) 24.453 (54.720) 20.690 (66.693) 
D (Furn) -9.788 (40.914) -19.416 (52.964) 
E (Clth) 50.044 (38.781) 13.138 (58.694) 
F (Ivled) 28.390 (68.644) 152.994 (104.595) 
Notc: Robl1St standard crrors in thc parcnthcscs 
本 8ignificantat a 5~え level
件 8ignificantat a 1 %lcvd 
OL8， Pri. IIItu FE， Pri II必 OL8， llO .u， FE‘no w 
2.212 (4.799) 2.420 (6.544) 0.771 (2.057) 0.761 (2.256) 
1.025 (1.002) 0.093 (1.364) 0.999 (0.799) 1.006 (0.913) 
0.223 (1. 778) 0.314 (2.213) 1.308 (1.400) 1.314 (1.438) 
0.465 (1.264) 0.751 (1.752) 0.572 (1.073) 0.580 (1.234) 
3.239 (1. 763) -4.737 (2.580) -2.416' (0.944) -2.424' (1.062) 
1.445 (1.922) 5.068 (3.646) 0.85;') (1.253) 0.860 (1.31;3) 
10.366* ( 4.487) 2.570 (9.256) 1.409 (1.814) 1.418 (1.933) 
0.056 (1. 719) -2.700 (2.385) 2.501 ' (1.222) 2.493 (1.417) 
2.516 (2.731 ) 1.998 (4.188) 0.190 (1.855) 。164 (2.080) 
1.553 (2.977) 3.245 ( 4.95) 2.087 (2.081) 2.058 (2.278) 
0.954 (2.892) 4.448 ( 4.262) 1.35;') (1.849) 1.380 (2.192) 
33.869 (35.363) 51.;302 (54.777) 6.387 (20.920) 6.738 (23.067) 
3.926 (6.199) 11.283 (9.071) 8.051 (9.792) 7.827 (10.790) 
0.175 (9.202) 0.431 (12.240) -6.611 (14.318) -6.727 (14.721) 
6.085 (7.144) -11.676 (10.108) 6.914 (11.764) 6.955 (13.974) 
3.606 (13.576) 12.465 (20.394) 0.839 (8.833) 0.966 (9.688) 
5.713 (10.539) 25.510 (20.307) -0.874 (13.842) -0.854 (14.483) 
37.895 (25.366) -43.599 (56.940) 43.237ホ (17.673)42.852' (19.255) 
11.155 (14.190) 3.045 (26.360) 36.541料 (13.981)36.365' (16.655) 
5.709 (16.106) 7.363 (24.761) 31.668 (21.274) 31.138 (23.213) 
15.688 (27.699) 48.043 ( 43.260) 2.363 (22.124) 1.825 (24.405) 
5.879 (14.603) 32.729 (24.756) 18.525 (16.499) 19.090 (17.192) 
90.377 (72.6;')1) 111.581 (119.280) 51.838 (66.927) 53.563 (71.531) 
13.313 (32.692) 12.332 (3;').648) 
42.732 (44.830) 43.383 (48.052) 
27.606 (35.756) 27.635 (42.007) 
36.952 (37.787) 16.337 (57.178) 36.878 (29.020) 36.514 (33.627) 
-8.624 (41.193) -8.630 (42.784) 
叫込
乙心
Table 9: Addit叩 lalreg町出凶nres山 sfor Eq(9) (Contin町 dfroll Table 4 and Table 8). 
OL5司 alllv FEヲal{I! 
!h G (Trans) -420.832料 (158.932)-61.965 (386.409) 
H (COllllll) 54.600 (59.562) 27.751 (76.832) 
1 (Educ) 236.997ネ (110.769)446.978' (173.067) 
.J (Rec) 142.008 (86.027) 225.041 (115.282) 
K (Oth) 79.424 (87.941) -14.595 (158.055) 
グバ (Food) 8.201 (10.256) 14.319 (12.245) 
B (Hse) 1.025 (9.078) 0.92;') (13.098) 
C (Util) 21.744 (24.422) 16.871 (31.095) 
D (Furn 9.004 (10.510) 15.949 (14.018) 
E (Clth) -5.975 (20.431) 12.665 (24.887) 
F (Med) 39.039料 (13.951) 46.607材 (14.229)
G (Trans) 88.899' (34.540) 143.442料 (33.049)
H (COllllll 4.187 (8.563) 8.965 (11.848) 
1 (Educ) -4.492 (7.708) 8.216 (10.415) 
.J (Rec) 5.295 (8.880) -0.917 (13.474) 
K (Oth) 16.420 (12.358) 24.867 (24.241 ) 
λ主(Food) 103.697 (64.707) ト125.839 (80.252) 
B (Hse) 68.498 (59.707) 72.95.5 (92.1.51) 
C (Util) 120.637 (122.221) 158.148 (142.906) 
D (Furn) 54.045 (44.934) 94.704 (62.564) 
E (Clth) 70.638 (105.842) 25.933 (121.678) 
F (Mcd) -246.711仲 (90.758)196.664 (122.823) 
G (Trans) -429.122料 (154.515)561.850件 (167.465)
H (COIlIl) 43.447 (51.462) 23.844 (68.542) 
1 (Educ) 21.995 ( 4;').509) 56.378 (63.785) 
.J (Rec) 89.844 (50.581) 73.765 (73.178) 
K (Oth) 165.175ネ (70.418) 226.727 (126.164) 
"fote: Ilobust standard errOl'S in the parentheses 
5ignifieant at a 5% lcvcl 
料 5ignific:antat a 1% level 
OL5司 Pri.II IV FEヲPriII UJ OL5. nOl日
-135.815ネ (60.253)
3.101 (35.612) 10.564 (75.217) 60.021 (42.537) 
57.685 (68.763) 
88.105 (72.823) 159.594 (115.193) 44.176 (62.410) 
41.446 (52.473) 
6.145 (11.919) 9.088 (13.775) 
2.902 (20.990) 13.461 (27.651) 
0.250 (6.533) 5.708 (9.661) 
-5.177 (8.031 ) 6.568 (11.414) 
86.218 (72.871 ) 109.612 (87.017) 
49.183 (106.676) 20.743 (140.771) 
44.289 ( 41.779) 28.017 (63.559) 
85.230 ( 48.(75) 94.680 (66.839) 








Table 10: lVIain results for the structural estimation for the whole sample 
OLS. al u) FE， alUJ OLS. Pri. II u) FE， Pri II w 
グ。 Const.ant. 0.013 (0.029 ) 0.016 (0.097) 0.010 (0.029 ) 0.005 (0.095) 
# childl'cn 0.131 (0.097) 0.129 (0.146) 0.097 (0.112) 。122 (0.136) 
Fcm. rat.io 7.842 (5.700) -21.191本 (8.903) 7.467 (5.593) -21.807本 (9.431 ) 
Log. 1nc. 0.303件 (0.115) 0.371件 (0.132)0.327料 (0.119) 0.376仲 (0.128)
1nc. l'atio 2.725件 (0.208) 2.711件 (0.221) 2.774料 (0.218) 2.806仲 (0.209)
32 t 0.148 (0.181) 0.156 (0.174) 
(!3 # childl'en -0.448 (0.519) -1.471 (0.939) -0.564 (0.553) 1.350 (0.806) 
Female rat.io 33.128 (30.164) 129.694* (54.127) 25.676 (29.423) 130.524ホ (55.514)
Log. 1nc. 0.382 (0.453) 0.726 (0.554) 0.523 (0.461 ) 0.764 (0.533) 
1nc. l'at.io -1.867本 (0.939) 1.718 (1.161 ) -1.979氷 (0.955) 2.006 (1.094) 
Log. pri. cxp 0.036 (0.044) 0.068 (0.058) 0.029 (0.046) 0.050 (0.065) 
Obs 1794 1794 1794 1794 
R2 0.303 0.350 0.284 0.320 
Pl'i. 1 Eq(10) / Eq(l1) 0.000 / 0.6;')3 0.000 / 0.138 
Pl'i. I Eq(10) / Eq(l1) 0.000 / 0.556 0.001 / 0.145 
Pl'i. IIIEq(10) / Eq(l1) 0.001 / 0.740 0.004/ 0.161 0.025 / 0.387 0.006 / 0.072 
1mpact. of onc morc child -0.037 (0.012) -0.061 (0.032) -0.034 (0.014) -0.057 (0.029) 
1mpact. of十1% inc. sharc 0.480 (0.161) 0.481 (0.160) 0.487 (0.165) 0.492 (0.167) 
"fote: Ilobust standard errors in the parentheses. /35， ij6， .37， ，38 andι'j" ornitted to save space 
ネ Significant.at a 5% lcvcl 
件 Significant.at a 1% lcvcl 














0.030 / 0.869 
0.030 / 0.710 
0.030 / 0.792 
-0.027 (0.009) 
0.481 (0.150) 













0.001 / 0.181 
0.001 / 0.179 
0.001 / 0.706 
-0.044 (0.013) 
0.485 (0.149) 
